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A STUDY OF IMPRECISE MARKOV CHAINS:
JOINT LOWER EXPECTATIONS AND POINT-WISE ERGODIC THEOREMS
GERT DE COOMAN, JASPER DE BOCK, AND STAVROS LOPATATZIDIS
ABSTRACT. We justify and discuss expressions for joint lower and upper expectations in
imprecise probability trees, in terms of the sub- and supermartingales that can be associated
with such trees. These imprecise probability trees can be seen as discrete-time stochastic
processes with finite state sets and transition probabilities that are imprecise, in the sense
that they are only known to belong to some convex closed set of probability measures. We
derive various properties for their joint lower and upper expectations, and in particular a
law of iterated expectations. We then focus on the special case of imprecise Markov chains,
investigate their Markov and stationarity properties, and use these, by way of an example,
to derive a system of non-linear equations for lower and upper expected transition and
return times. Most importantly, we prove a game-theoretic version of the strong law of
large numbers for submartingale differences in imprecise probability trees, and use this to
derive point-wise ergodic theorems for imprecise Markov chains.
1. INTRODUCTION
In Ref. [3], De Cooman and Hermans made a first attempt at laying the foundations
for a theory of discrete-event (and discrete-time) stochastic processes that are governed
by sets of, rather than single, probability measures. They showed how this can be done
by connecting Walley’s [1991] theory of coherent lower previsions with ideas and results
from Shafer and Vovk’s [2001] game-theoretic approach to probability theory. In later pa-
pers, De Cooman et al. [7] applied these ideas to finite-state discrete-time Markov chains,
inspired by the work of Hartfiel [10]. They showed how to perform efficient inferences
in, and proved a Perron–Frobenius-like theorem for, so-called imprecise Markov chains,
which are finite-state discrete-time Markov chains whose transition probabilities are im-
precise, in the sense that they are only known to belong to a convex closed set of proba-
bility measures—typically due to partial assessments involving probabilistic inequalities.
This work was later refined and extended by Hermans and De Cooman [11] and Škulj and
Hable [20].
The Perron–Frobenius-like theorems in these papers give equivalent necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for the uncertainty model—a set of probabilities—about the state Xn to
converge, for n→+∞, to an uncertainty model that is independent of the uncertainty model
for the initial state X1.
In Markov chains with ‘precise’ transition probabilities, this convergence behaviour is
sufficient for a point-wise ergodic theorem to hold, namely that:
lim
n→+∞
1
n
n
∑
k=1
f (Xk) = E∞( f ) almost surely
for all real functions f on the finite state set X , where E∞ is the limit expectation oper-
ator that the expectation operators En for the state Xn at time n converge to point-wise,
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independently of the initial model E1 for X1, according to the classical Perron–Frobenius
Theorem.1
One of the aims of the present paper is to extend this result to a version for impre-
cise Markov chains; see Theorem 32 further on. In contradistinction with the so-called
Markov set-chains more commonly encountered in the literature [8–10], our imprecise
Markov chains are not merely collections of (precise) Markov chains—incidentally, for
such Markov set-chains, proving an ergodic theorem would be a fairly trivial affair, as it
would amount to applying the classical point-wise ergodic theorem to each of the Markov
chains in the collection. Rather, as we will explain in Section 6, our imprecise Markov
chains correspond to a collection of stochastic processes that need not satisfy the Markov
property. They are only ‘superficially Markov’, in the sense that their sets of transition
probabilities satisfy a Markov condition, whereas the individual members of those sets
need not. In other words, imprecise Markov chains are not simply collections of precise
Markov chains, but rather correspond to collections of general stochastic processes whose
transition models belong to sets that satisfy a Markov condition.
How do we mean to go about proving our ergodicity result? In Section 2, we explain
what we mean by imprecise probability models: we extend the notion of an expectation
operator to so-called lower (and upper) expectation operators, and explain how these can
be associated with (convex and closed) sets of expectation operators.
In Section 3, we explain how these generalised uncertainty models can be combined
with event trees to form so-called imprecise probability trees, to produce a simple theory
of discrete-time stochastic processes. We show in particular how to combine local uncer-
tainty models associated with the nodes in the tree into global uncertainty models (global
conditional lower expectations) about the paths in the tree, and how this procedure is related
to sub- and supermartingales. We also indicate how it extends and subsumes the (precise-
)probabilistic approach.
In Section 4 we prove a very general strong law of large numbers for submartingale
differences in our imprecise probability trees. Our point-wise ergodic theorem will turn out
to be a consequence of this in the particular context of imprecise Markov chains. Section 5
is more technical, and is devoted to extending the joint lower and upper expectations to
extended real variables, and to proving a number of important properties for them, such as
generalisations of well-known coherence properties, and a version of the law of iterated
(lower) expectations.
We explain what imprecise Markov chains are in Section 6: how they are special cases
of imprecise probability trees, how to do efficient inference for them, and how to define
Perron–Frobenius-like behaviour. We generalise existing results [7] about global lower ex-
pectations in such imprecise Markov trees from a finite to an infinite time horizon, and from
bounded real argument functions to extended real-valued ones. We also explore the influ-
ence of time shifts on the global (conditional) lower expectations, investigate their Markov
properties, prove various corollaries of the law of iterated lower expectations, and discuss
stationarity and its relation with Perron–Frobenius-like behaviour. As an illustration of the
power of our approach, we derive in Section 7 a system of non-linear equations for lower
and upper expected transition and return times, and solve it in special case.
In Section 8 we show that there is an interesting identity between the time averages
that appear in our strong law of large numbers, and the ones that appear in the point-wise
ergodic theorem. The discussion in Section 9 first focusses on a number of terms in this
identity, and investigates their convergence for Perron–Frobenius-like imprecise Markov
chains. This allows us to use the identity to prove two versions of the point-wise ergodic
1Actually, much more general results can be proved, for functions f that do not depend on a single state only,
but on the entire sequence of states; see for instance Ref. [12, Chapter 20]. In this paper, we will focus on the
simpler version, but we will show that it can be extended to functions on a finite number of states.
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theorem: one for functions of a single state (Theorem 32) and its extension (Corollary 33)
to functions of a finite number of states. We briefly discuss their significance in Section 10.
Some of the results in this paper have already been discussed—without proofs—in an
earlier conference version [6]. This paper significantly extends the earlier version.
2. BASIC NOTIONS FROM IMPRECISE PROBABILITIES
Let us begin with a brief sketch of a few basic definitions and results about imprecise
probabilities. For more details, we refer to Walley’s [21] seminal book, as well as more
recent textbooks [1, 18].
Suppose a subject is uncertain about the value that a variable Y assumes in a non-empty
set of possible values Y . He is therefore also uncertain about the value f (Y ) a so-called
gamble—a bounded real-valued function— f : Y → R on the set Y assumes in R. We
will also call such an f a gamble on Y when we want to make explicit what variable Y
the gamble f is intended to depend on. The subject’s uncertainty is modelled by a lower
expectation2 E , which is a real functional defined on the set G (Y ) of all gambles on the
set Y , satisfying the following basic so-called coherence axioms:
LE1. E( f )≥ inf f for all f ∈ G (Y ); [bounds]
LE2. E( f + g)≥ E( f )+E(g) for all f ,g ∈ G (Y ); [superadditivity]
LE3. E(λ f ) = λ E( f ) for all f ∈ G (Y ) and real λ ≥ 0. [non-negative homogeneity]
One—but by no means the only3—way to interpret E( f ) is as a lower bound on the expecta-
tion E( f ) of the gamble f (Y ). The corresponding upper bounds are given by the conjugate
upper expectation E , defined by E( f ) := −E(− f ) for all f ∈ G (Y ). It follows from the
coherence axioms LE1–LE3 that
LE4. E( f )≤ E(g) and E( f ) ≤ E(g) for all f ,g ∈ G (Y ) with f ≤ g;
LE5. inf f ≤ E( f ) ≤ E( f )≤ sup f for all f ∈ G (Y );
LE6. E( f + g)≤ E( f )+E(g) for all f ,g ∈ G (Y ); [subadditivity]
LE7. E(λ f ) = λ E( f ) for all f ∈ G (Y ) and real λ ≥ 0. [non-negative homogeneity]
LE8. E( f + µ) = E( f )+ µ and E( f + µ) = E( f )+ µ for all f ∈ G (Y ) and real µ .
Lower and upper expectations will be the basic uncertainty models we consider in this
paper.
The indicator IA of an event A—a subset of Y —is the gamble on Y that assumes the
value 1 on A and 0 outside A. It allows us to introduce the lower and upper probabilities
of the event A as P(A) := E(IA) and P(A) := E(IA), respectively. They can be seen as
lower and upper bounds on the probability P(A) of A, and satisfy the conjugacy relation
P(A) = 1−P(Y \A).
When the lower bound E coincides with the upper bound E, the resulting functional
E := E = E satisfies the defining axioms of an expectation:
E1. E( f ) ≥ inf f for all f ∈ G (Y ); [bounds]
E2. E( f + g) = E( f )+E(g) for all f ,g ∈ G (Y ); [additivity]
E3. E(λ f ) = λ E( f ) for all f ∈ G (Y ) and real λ . [homogeneity]
When Y is finite, E is trivially the expectation associated with a (probability) mass function
p defined by p(y) :=P({y}) =P({y}) for all y∈Y , because it follows from the expectation
axioms that then E( f ) = ∑y∈Y f (y)p(y); see for instance also the detailed discussion in
Ref. [18].
2In the literature [1, 18, 21], other names, such as coherent lower expectation, or coherent lower prevision,
have also been given to this concept.
3See Refs. [15, 18, 21] for other interpretations.
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With any lower expectation E , we can always associate the following convex and closed4
set of compatible expectations:
M(E) := {E expectation: (∀ f ∈ G (Y ))E( f ) ≤ E( f )≤ E( f )}, (1)
and the properties LE1–LE3 then guarantee that
E( f ) = min{E( f ) : E ∈M(E)} and E( f ) = max{E( f ) : E ∈M(E)} for all f ∈ G (Y ).
(2)
In this sense, an imprecise probability model E can always be identified with a closed
convex set M(E) of compatible ‘precise’ probability models E .
3. DISCRETE-TIME FINITE-STATE IMPRECISE STOCHASTIC PROCESSES
We consider a discrete-time process as a sequence of variables, henceforth called states,
X1, X2, . . . , Xn, . . . , where the state Xk at time k is assumed to take values in a non-empty
finite set Xk.
3.1. Event trees, situations, paths and cuts. We will use, for any natural k ≤ ℓ, the nota-
tion Xk:ℓ for the tuple (Xk, . . . ,Xℓ), which can be seen as a variable assumed to take values
in the Cartesian product set Xk:ℓ := ×ℓr=kXr. We denote the set of all natural numbers
(without 0) by N, and let N0 := N∪{0}.
We call any x1:n ∈ X1:n for n ∈ N0 a situation and we denote the set of all situations
by Ω♦. So any situation is a finite string of possible values for the consecutive states, and
if we denote the empty string by , then in particular, X1:0 = {}.  is called the initial
situation. We also use the generic notations s, t or u for situations.
An infinite sequence of state values is called a path, and we denote the set of all paths—
also called the sample space—by Ω. Hence
Ω♦ :=
⋃
n∈N0
X1:n and Ω :=×∞r=1Xk.
We will denote generic paths by ω . For any path ω ∈ Ω, the initial sequence that consists
of its first n elements is a situation in X1:n that is denoted by ωn. Its n-th element belongs
to Xn and is denoted by ωn. As a convention, we let its 0-th element be the initial situation
ω0 = ω0 = . The possible realisations ω of a process can be represented graphically as
paths in a so-called event tree, where each node is a situation; see Figure 1.
a
(a,a)
(a,a,a) (a,a,b)
(a,b)
(a,b,a) (a,b,b)
b
(b,a)
(b,a,a) (b,a,b)
(b,b)
(b,b,a) (b,b,b)
X1:1
X1:2
X1:3
FIGURE 1. The (initial part of the) event tree for a process whose states
can assume two values, a and b, and can change at time instants n =
1,2,3, . . . Each node in the tree corresponds to a situation. Also depicted
are the respective sets of situations (cuts) X1:1, X1:2 and X1:3 where the
states at times 1, 2 and 3 are revealed.
4The ‘closedness’ is associated with the weak* topology of point-wise convergence [21, Section 3.6].
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We write that s ⊑ t, and say that s precedes t or that t follows s, when every path that
goes through t also goes through s. The binary relation ⊑ is a partial order, and we write
s⊏ t whenever s⊑ t but not s = t. We say that s and t are incomparable when neither s⊑ t
nor t ⊑ s.
A (partial) cut U is a collection of mutually incomparable situations, and represents a
stopping time. For any two cuts U and V , we define the following sets of situations:
[U,V ] :={s ∈Ω♦ : (∃u ∈U)(∃v ∈V )u ⊑ s⊑ v}
[U,V ) :={s ∈Ω♦ : (∃u ∈U)(∃v ∈V )u ⊑ s⊏ v}
(U,V ] :={s ∈Ω♦ : (∃u ∈U)(∃v ∈V )u⊏ s⊑ v}
(U,V ) :={s ∈Ω♦ : (∃u ∈U)(∃v ∈V )u⊏ s⊏ v}.
When a cut U consists of a single element u, then we will identify U = {u} and u. This
slight abuse of notation will for instance allow us to write [u,v] = {s ∈Ω♦ : u⊑ s⊑ v} and
also (U,v) = {s∈Ω♦ : (∃u∈U)u⊏ s⊏ v}. We also write U ⊏V if (∀v∈V )(∃u∈U)u⊏ v.
Observe that in that case U ∩V = /0. In particular, s ⊐U when there is some u ∈U such
that s⊐ u, or in other words if [U,s) 6= /0.
3.2. Processes. A process F is a map defined on Ω♦. A real process is a real-valued
process: it associates a real number F (x1:n)∈R with any situation x1:n. It is called bounded
below if there is some real B such that F (s) ≥ B for all situations s ∈ Ω♦, and bounded
above if −F is bounded below.
A gamble process D is a process that associates with any situation x1:n a gamble D(x1:n)∈
G (Xn+1) on Xn+1. It is called uniformly bounded if there is some real B such that |D(s)| ≤
B for all situations s ∈ Ω♦. With any real process F , we can always associate a gamble
process ∆F , called the process difference. For every situation x1:n, the gamble ∆F (x1:n) ∈
G (Xn+1) is defined by5
∆F (x1:n)(xn+1) := F (x1:n+1)−F (x1:n) for all xn+1 ∈Xn+1.
We will denote this more succinctly by ∆F (x1:n) = F (x1:n ·)−F (x1:n), where the ‘·’ rep-
resents the generic value of the next state Xn+1.
Conversely, with a gamble process D , we can associate a real process I D , defined by
I
D (x1:n) :=
n−1
∑
k=0
D(x1:k)(xk+1) for all n ∈N0 and x1:n ∈X1:n.
Clearly, ∆I D = D and F = F ()+I ∆F .
Also, with any real process F we can associate the path-averaged process 〈F 〉, which
is the real process defined by:
〈F 〉(x1:n) :=


0 if n = 0
∑n−1k=0 ∆F (x1:k)(xk+1)
n
if n > 0
for all n ∈ N0 and x1:n ∈X1:n.
We can generalise this notion of path-averaging even further as follows. Consider any real
process S that only assumes values in {0,1}. Then the S -averaged process 〈F 〉
S
is the
real process defined by:
〈F 〉
S
(x1:n) :=


0 if ∑n−1k=0 S (x1:k) = 0
∑n−1k=0 S (x1:k)∆F (x1:k)(xk+1)
∑n−1k=0 S (x1:k)
if ∑n−1k=0 S (x1:k)> 0
for all n ∈ N0 and x1:n ∈X1:n.
5Our assumption that Xn+1 is finite is crucial here because it guarantees that ∆F (x1:n) is bounded, which in
turn implies that it is indeed a gamble.
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Of course, if S is identically equal to 1 in all situations, then 〈F 〉
S
= 〈F 〉. In order to
unburden our formulas somewhat, we will permit ourselves the slight abuse of notation
I S (x1:n) := ∑n−1k=0 S (x1:k) for all n ∈ N0 and x1:n ∈X1:n.
3.3. Imprecise probability trees, submartingales and supermartingales. The standard
way to turn an event tree into a probability tree is to attach to each of its nodes, or situa-
tions x1:n, a local probability model Q(·|x1:n) for what will happen immediately afterwards,
i.e. for the value that the next state Xn+1 will assume in Xn+1. This local model Q(·|x1:n) is
then an expectation operator on the set G (Xn+1) of all gambles g(Xn+1) on the next state
Xn+1, conditional on observing X1:n = x1:n.
In a completely similar way, we can turn an event tree into an imprecise probability
tree by attaching to each of its situations x1:n a local imprecise probability model Q(·|x1:n)
for what will happen immediately afterwards, i.e. for the value that the next state Xn+1
will assume in Xn+1. This local model Q(·|x1:n) is then a lower expectation operator on
the set G (Xn+1) of all gambles g(Xn+1) on the next state Xn+1, conditional on observing
X1:n = x1:n. This is represented graphically in Figure 2.
a
(a,a)
(a,a,a) (a,a,b)
(a,b)
(a,b,a) (a,b,b)
b
(b,a)
(b,a,a) (b,a,b)
(b,b)
(b,b,a) (b,b,b)
Q(·|)
Q(·|a) Q(·|b)
Q(·|a,a) Q(·|b,b)Q(·|b,a)Q(·|a,b)
FIGURE 2. The (initial part of the) imprecise probability tree for a pro-
cess whose states can assume two values, a and b, and can change at time
instants n = 1,2,3, . . .
In a given imprecise probability tree, a submartingale M is a real process such that
Q(∆M (x1:n)|x1:n) ≥ 0 for all n ∈ N0 and x1:n ∈ X1:n: all submartingale differences have
non-negative lower expectation. A real process M is a supermartingale if −M is a sub-
martingale, meaning that Q(∆M (x1:n)|x1:n) ≤ 0 for all n ∈ N0 and x1:n ∈ X1:n: all su-
permartingale differences have non-positive upper expectation. We denote the set of all
submartingales for a given imprecise probability tree by M—whether a real process is a
submartingale depends of course on the local uncertainty models. The set of all submartin-
gales that are bounded above is denoted by Mb. Similarly, the set M :=−M is the set of all
supermartingales, and Mb :=−Mb the set of all supermartingales that are bounded below.
In the present context of probability trees, we will also call variable any function defined
on the so-called sample space—the set Ω of all paths. When this variable is real-valued and
bounded, we will also call it a gamble on Ω. When it is extended real-valued, meaning that
it assumes values in the set R∗ := R∪{−∞,+∞}, we call in an extended real variable. An
event A in this context is a subset of Ω, and its indicator IA is a gamble on Ω assuming the
value 1 on A and 0 elsewhere. With any situation x1:n, we can associate the so-called exact
event Γ(x1:n) that X1:n = x1:n, which is the set of all paths ω ∈ Ω that go through x1:n:
Γ(x1:n) := {ω ∈ Ω : ωn = x1:n}.
We will also use the generic notation ‘x1:n •’ for all such paths in Γ(x1:n). For a given
n∈N0, we call a variable ξ n-measurable if it is constant on the exact events Γ(x1:n) for all
x1:n ∈X1:n, or in other words, if it only depends on the values of the first n states X1:n. We
then use the obvious notation ξ (x1:n) for its constant value ξ (ω) on all paths ω in Γ(x1:n).
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In particular, this means that we can—and will—identify an n-measurable gamble g on Ω
with a gamble on X1:n, and write that g ∈ G (X1:n).
We will also use a convenient notational device often encountered in texts on stochastic
processes: when we want to indicate which states a process or variable depends on, we
indicate them explicitly in the notation. Thus, we use for instance the notation F (X1:n) to
indicate the ‘uncertain’ value of the process F after the first n time steps, write f (Xn) for a
variable that only depends on the value of the n-th state, and similarly g(X1:n) for a variable
that only depends on the values of the first n states.
With a real process F , we can associate in particular the following extended real vari-
ables liminfF and limsupF , defined for all ω ∈ Ω by:
liminfF (ω) := liminf
n→∞
F (ωn) and limsupF (ω) := limsup
n→∞
F (ωn).
If liminfF (ω) = limsupF (ω) on some path ω , then we also denote the common value
there by limF (ω) = limn→∞ F (ωn).
The following useful result is a variation on a result proved in Ref. [17, Lemma 1], and
is similar in spirit to a result proved earlier in Ref. [3, Lemma 2].
Lemma 1. Consider any submartingale M and any situation s ∈ Ω♦, then:
M (s)≤ sup
ω∈Γ(s)
liminfM (ω)≤ sup
ω∈Γ(s)
limsupM (ω).
Proof. Consider any real α , and assume that M (s)> α . Assume that s = x1:n with n∈N0.
Since M is a submartingale, we know that Q(M (x1:n ·)−M (x1:n)|x1:n)≥ 0, and therefore,
by coherence [LE5 and LE8] and the assumption, that
maxM (x1:n ·)≥ Q(M (x1:n ·)|x1:n)≥M (x1:n)> α,
implying that there is some xn+1 ∈ Xn+1 such that M (x1:n+1) > α . Repeating the same
argument over and over again, this leads to the conclusion that there is some ω ∈ Γ(x1:n)
such that M (ωn+k) > α for all k ∈ N0, whence liminfM (ω) ≥ α , and therefore also
supω∈Γ(x1:n) liminfM (ω)≥ α . The rest of the proof is now immediate. 
3.4. Going from local to global belief models. So far, we have associated local uncer-
tainty models with an imprecise probability tree. These represent, in any situation x1:n,
beliefs about what will happen immediately afterwards, or in other words about the step
from x1:n to x1:n Xn+1.
We now want to turn these local models into global ones: uncertainty models about
which entire path ω is taken in the event tree, rather than which local steps are taken from
one situation to the next. We will use the following expression for the global lower expec-
tation conditional on the situation s:
E(g|s) := sup{M (s) : M ∈M and limsupM (ω)≤ g(ω) for all ω ∈ Γ(s)}, (3)
and for the conjugate global upper expectation conditional on the situation s:
E(g|s) := inf{M (s) : M ∈M and liminfM (ω)≥ g(ω) for all ω ∈ Γ(s)} (4)
=−E(−g|s),
where g is any gamble on Ω, and s ∈ Ω♦ any situation. We use the simplified notations
E = E(·|) and E = E(·|) for the (unconditional) global models, associated with the
initial situation .
Our reasons for using these so-called Shafer–Vovk–Ville formulae6 are fourfold.
First of all, they are formally very closely related to the expressions for lower and up-
per prices in Shafer and Vovk’s game-theoretic approach to probabilities, see for instance
Refs. [16, Chapter 8.3] and [19, Section 6.3]. This allows us to import and adapt, with the
6We give this name to these formulae because Glenn Shafer and Vladimir Vovk first suggested them, based
on the ideas of Jean Ville; see the discussion of Ville’s Theorem in Ref. [16, Appendix 8.5].
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necessary care, quite a number of powerful convergence results from that theory, as we will
see in Section 4. Moreover, Shafer and Vovk (see for instance Refs. [16, Proposition 8.8]
and [19, Section 6.3]) have shown that they satisfy our defining properties for lower and
upper expectations in Section 2, which is why we are calling them lower and upper expec-
tations; see also Proposition 14 further on.
Secondly, as we gather from the following proposition and corollary, the expressions (3)
and (4) coincide for n-measurable gambles on Ω with the formulae derived in Ref. [3] as
the most conservative7 global lower and upper expectations that extend the local models.8
Proposition 2. For any situation x1:m ∈ Ω♦ and any n-measurable gamble g on Ω, with
n,m ∈ N0 such that n ≥ m:
E(g|x1:m) = sup{M (x1:m) : M ∈M and (∀xm+1:n ∈Xm+1:n)M (x1:n)≤ g(x1:n)}
E(g|x1:m) = inf{M (x1:m) : M ∈M and (∀xm+1:n ∈Xm+1:n)M (x1:n)≥ g(x1:n)}.
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Proposition 11 in Section 5. 
Corollary 3. Consider any n ∈ N0, any situation x1:n ∈ Ω♦, and any (n+ 1)-measurable
gamble g on Ω. Then
E(g|x1:n) = Q(g(x1:n ·)|x1:n) and E(g|x1:n) = Q(g(x1:n ·)|x1:n).
Proof. We give the proof for the lower expectation; the proof for the upper expectation is
completely similar.
First, consider any M ∈M such that M (x1:n ·) ≤ g(x1:n ·), then it follows from coher-
ence [LE4 and LE8] and the submartingale character of M that
Q(g(x1:n ·)|x1:n)≥ Q(M (x1:n ·)|x1:n)≥M (x1:n),
so Proposition 2 guarantees that E(g|x1:n)≤ Q(g(x1:n ·)|x1:n).
To show that the inequality is actually an equality, consider any submartingale M such
that M (x1:n) = Q(g(x1:n ·)|x1:n) and M (x1:n ·) = g(x1:n ·). 
Thirdly, it is (essentially) the expressions in Proposition 2 that we have used in Ref. [7,
11, 20] for our studies of imprecise Markov chains, which we report in Section 6. The main
result of the present paper, Theorem 32 in Section 9, will build on the Perron–Frobenius-
like results proved in those papers.
Fourthly, it was also shown in Ref. [3] that the expressions in Proposition 2 have an
interesting interpretation in terms of (precise) probability trees. Indeed, we can associate
with an imprecise probability tree a (usually infinite) collection of (so-called compatible)
precise probability trees with the same event tree, by associating with each situation s in
the event tree some arbitrarily chosen precise local expectation Q(·|s) that belongs to the
convex closed set M(Q(·|s)) of expectations that are compatible with the local lower ex-
pectation Q(·|s). For any n-measurable gamble f on Ω, the global precise expectations in
the compatible precise probability trees will then range over a closed interval whose lower
and upper bounds are given by the expressions in Proposition 2.
And finally, Shafer and Vovk have shown [16, Chapter 8] that when the local models are
precise probability models, these formulae (3) and (4) lead to global models that coincide
with the ones found in measure-theoretic probability theory. This implies that the results
we will prove below, subsume, as special cases, the classical results of measure-theoretic
probability theory.
7By more conservative, we mean associated with a larger set of precise models, so point-wise smaller for
lower expectations, and point-wise larger for upper expectations.
8We have also shown in recent, still unpublished work that in a more general context—where Xk takes values
in a possibly infinite set Xk—for arbitrary gambles on Ω they are the most conservative global models that extend
the local ones and satisfy additional conglomerability and continuity properties.
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4. A STRONG LAW OF LARGE NUMBERS FOR SUBMARTINGALE DIFFERENCES
We now discuss and prove two powerful convergence results for the processes we have
defined in the previous section.
We call an event A null if P(A) = E (IA) = 0, and strictly null if there is some test
supermartingale T that converges to +∞ on A, meaning that:
limT (ω) = +∞ for all ω ∈ A.
Here, a test supermartingale is a supermartingale with T () = 1 that is moreover non-
negative in the sense that T (s)≥ 0 for all situations s ∈Ω♦. Any strictly null event is null,
but null events need not be strictly null [19].
Proposition 4. Any strictly null event is null, but not vice versa.9
Proof. Consider any event A. Recall the following expression for P(A):
P(A) = E(IA) = inf{M () : M ∈M and liminfM ≥ IA}. (5)
Also, consider any supermartingale M such that liminfM ≥ IA, then it follows from
Lemma 1 and the fact that −M is a submartingale that
M ()≥ inf
ω∈Ω
liminfM (ω)≥ inf
ω∈Ω
IA(ω)≥ 0. (6)
Combined with Equation (5), this implies that P(A)≥ 0.10
We are now ready for the proof. Assume that A is strictly null, so there is some test su-
permartingale T that converges to +∞ on A. Then for any α > 0, αT is a supermartingale
such that liminf(αT ) ≥ IA, and therefore we infer that 0 ≤ P(A) ≤ αT () = α , where
the second inequality follows from Equation (5). Since this holds for all α > 0, we find
that P(A) = 0.
To show that not every null event is strictly null, we show that while an exact event may
be null, it can never be strictly null.
First, we show that exact events may be null. Consider any situation x1:n+1, with n∈N0,
such that Q(I{xn+1}|x1:n) = 0, then we show that P(Γ(x1:n+1)) = 0. Indeed, consider the real
process M that assumes the value 1 in all situations that follow (or coincide with) x1:n+1,
and 0 elsewhere. Then clearly M () = 0, liminfM = IΓ(x1:n+1) and M is a supermartin-
gale because Q(M (x1:n ·)|x1:n) =Q(I{xn+1}|x1:n) = 0=M (x1:n). Equation (5) now implies
that P(Γ(x1:n+1)) ≤ 0 and therefore—since we already know that P(Γ(x1:n+1)) ≥ 0—that
P(Γ(x1:n+1)) = 0.
Next, if Γ(s) were strictly null, there would be a test supermartingale M that converges
to +∞ on Γ(s), and therefore Lemma 1 and the fact that −M is a submartingale would
imply that M (s) ≥ infω∈Γ(s) liminfM (ω) = +∞, which is impossible for the real pro-
cess M . 
In this paper, we will use the ‘strict’ approach, and prove that events are strictly null—
and therefore also null—by actually showing that there is a test supermartingale that con-
verges to +∞ there.
As usual, an inequality or equality between two variables is said to hold (strictly) almost
surely when the event that it does not hold is (strictly) null. Shafer and Vovk [16, 19]
have proved the following interesting result, which we will have occasion to use a few
times further on. It can be seen as a generalisation of Doob’s supermartingale convergence
theorem [24, Sections 11.5–7] to imprecise probability trees. We provide its proof, adapted
from Ref. [17] to our specific definitions and assumptions, with corrections for a few tiny
glitches, for the sake of completeness.
9We infer from the proof that for the null and strictly null events to be the same, it is necessary to consider
supermartingales that may assume extended real values, as is done in Refs. [17, 19]. We see no need for doing so
in the context of the present paper.
10This will also follow from LE*5 further on.
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Theorem 5 ([19, Section 6.5] Supermartingale convergence theorem). Let M be a su-
permartingale that is bounded below. Then M converges strictly almost surely to a real
variable.
Proof. Because M is bounded below, we may assume without loss of generality that M
is non-negative and that M () = 1, as adding real constants to M , or multiplying it with
positive real constants, does not affect its convergence properties nor—by coherence [LE3
and LE8] of the local models—the fact that it is a supermartingale. Hence, M is a test
supermartingale. Also, because M is bounded below, it cannot converge to−∞ on any path.
Let A be the event where M converges to +∞, and let B be the event where it diverges. We
have to show that there is a test supermartingale that converges to +∞ on A∪B.
Associate with any couple of rational numbers 0 < a < b the following recursively de-
fined sequences of cuts Ua,bk and V
a,b
k . Let V
a,b
0 := {}, and for k ∈ N:
Ua,bk :={s⊐V
a,b
k−1 : M (s)> b and (∀t ∈ (V
a,b
k−1,s))M (t)≤ b} (7)
V a,bk :={s⊐U
a,b
k : M (s) < a and (∀t ∈ (U
a,b
k ,s))M (t)≥ a}. (8)
Consider the real process T a,b with the following recursive definition:
T
a,b() := 1 and T a,b(s ·) :=
{
T a,b(s)+∆M (s) if s ∈
⋃
k∈N[V
a,b
k−1,U
a,b
k )
T a,b(s) otherwise.
(9)
We now show that T a,b is a test supermartingale that converges to +∞ on any path ω for
which liminfM (ω)< a < b < limsupM (ω).
In what follows, for any situation s and for any k ∈ N, when s ⊐ Ua,bk , we denote by
usk the (necessarily unique) situation in Ua,bk such that usk ⊏ s. Similarly, for any k ∈ N0,
when s⊐ V a,bk , we denote by vsk the (necessarily unique) situation in V a,bk such that vsk ⊏ s;
observe that vs0 =. Recall from Equations (7) and (8) that, for all k ∈ N, M (usk)> b and
M (vsk)< a.
Since it follows from Equation (9) that ∆T a,b(s) is zero or equal to ∆M (s), it follows
from coherence [LE5] and Q(∆M (s)|s)≤ 0 that Q(∆T a,b(s)|s)≤ 0 for all situations s, so
T a,b is indeed a supermartingale.
To prove that T a,b is non-negative, we recall from Equation (9) that T a,b can only
change in situations s ∈ [V a,bk−1,U
a,b
k ), with k ∈ N. Since T a,b() = 1, taking into account
Lemma 6, this means that we only have to prove that T a,b(c)≥ 0 for the children c of the
situations s ∈ [V a,bk−1,U
a,b
k ), with k ∈ N. There are two possible cases to consider: The first
case (a) is that s ∈ [,Ua,b1 ). Since T a,b() = M () = 1, we gather from Equation (9)
for k = 1 that then T a,b(c) = M (c)≥ 0 for all children c of s. The second case (b) is that
s ∈ [V a,bk ,U
a,b
k+1) for some k ∈ N. We then gather from Equation (9) and Lemma 6 that for
all children c of s
T
a,b(c) = T a,b()+ [M (us1)−M ()]+
k
∑
ℓ=2
[M (usℓ)−M (v
s
ℓ−1)]+ [M (c)−M (v
s
k)]
≥ b+(k− 1)(b− a)+M (c)−M (vsk)≥ k(b− a)+M (c)≥ k(b− a)≥ 0.
We conclude that T a,b is indeed non-negative.
It remains to prove that T a,b converges to +∞ on all paths ω where liminfM (ω) <
a < b < limsupM (ω). By Lemma 6, any such path ω goes through the entire chain of
cuts V a,b0 ⊏U
a,b
1 ⊏V
a,b
1 ⊏ · · ·⊏U
a,b
n ⊏V a,bn ⊏ · · · , meaning that for any situation s on this
path ω , one of the following cases obtains. The first case is that s ∈ [,Ua,b1 ]. We gather
from the discussion of case (a) above that then T a,b(s) = M (s). The second case is that
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s ∈ (Ua,bk ,V
a,b
k ] for some k ∈N. Then we gather from Equation (9) and Lemma 6 that
T
a,b(s) = T a,b()+ [M (us1)−M ()]+
k
∑
ℓ=2
[M (usℓ)−M (v
s
ℓ−1)]≥ b+(k− 1)(b− a).
And the third possible case is that s ∈ (V a,bk ,U
a,b
k+1] for some k ∈ N. Then we gather from
the discussion of case (b) above that T a,b(s) ≥ k(b− a). Since b > a, we conclude that
indeed limM (ω) = +∞.
To finish, use the countable set of rational couples K := {(a,b) ∈Q2 : 0 < a < b} to de-
fine the process T by letting T () := 1 and, for all s∈Ω♦, ∆T (s) :=∑(a,b)∈K wa,b∆T a,b(s),
a countable convex combination of the real numbers ∆T a,b(s), with coefficients wa,b > 0
that sum to 1. Observe that
∆T (s) = ∑
(a,b)∈K
wa,b∆T a,b(s) = γ(s)∆M (s) ∈ R,
where γ(s) ∈ [0,1], because it follows from Equation (9) that for any (a,b) ∈ K, ∆T a,b(s)
is equal to ∆M (s) or zero. As an immediate consequence, T is a real process and T =
∑(a,b)∈K wa,bT a,b. Clearly, T has T () = 1, is non-negative and converges to +∞ on B.
Moreover, since ∆T (s)= γ(s)∆M (s), it follows from coherence [LE7] that Q(∆T (s)|s) =
γ(s)Q(∆M (s)|s)≤ 0 for all s ∈ Ω♦, so T is a test supermartingale.
Since coherence [LE6 and LE7] implies that a convex combination of two test super-
martingales is again a test supermartingale, we conclude from all these considerations that
the process 12 (M +T ) is a test supermartingale that converges to +∞ on A∪B. 
Lemma 6. V a,bk−1 ⊏U
a,b
k ⊏V
a,b
k for all k ∈ N;
Proof. The statement follows immediately from Equations (7) and (8). The case V a,bk−1 = /0
presents no problem, because Equation (7) tells us that then Ua,bk = /0 as well. Neither does
the case Ua,bk = /0, because Equation (8) tells us that then V a,bk = /0 as well. 
We now turn to a very general version of the strong law of large numbers. Weak (as
well as less general) versions of this law were proved by one of us in Refs. [3, 4]. It is this
law that will, in Section 9, be used to derive our version of the point-wise ergodic theorem.
Its proof is based on a tried-and-tested method for constructing test supermartingales that
goes back to an idea in Ref. [16, Lemma 3.3].
Theorem 7. Let M be a submartingale such that ∆M is uniformly bounded and let S be
a real process that only assumes values in {0,1}. Then strictly almost surely:
limI S =+∞ ⇒ liminf〈M 〉
S
≥ 0.
If S is equal to 1 in all situations, then limI S =+∞ on all paths, so the following special
case is immediate.
Corollary 8 (Strong law of large numbers for submartingale differences). Let M be a
submartingale such that ∆M is uniformly bounded. Then liminf〈M 〉 ≥ 0 strictly almost
surely.
Proof of Theorem 7. Consider the events A := {ω ∈ Ω : liminf〈M 〉
S
(ω) < 0} and D :=
{ω ∈ Ω : limI S (ω) = +∞}. We have to show that there is some test supermartingale
T that converges to +∞ on the set D∩A. Let B > 0 be any uniform real bound on ∆M ,
meaning that |∆M (s)| ≤ B for all situations s ∈ Ω♦. We can always assume that B > 1.
For any r ∈ N, let Ar := {ω ∈ Ω : liminf〈M 〉S (ω) < − 12r }, then A =
⋃
r∈N Ar. So fix
any r ∈ N and consider any ω ∈ D∩Ar, then
liminf
n→+∞
〈M 〉
S
(ωn)<−
1
2r
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and therefore
(∀m ∈ N)(∃nm ≥ m)〈M 〉S (ω
nm)<−
1
2r
=−ε,
with ε := 12r > 0. Consider now the positive supermartingale of Lemma 9, with in particular
ξ := ε2B2 = 12r+1B2 .11 Denote this test supermartingale by F (r)M . It follows from Lemma 9
that
F
(r)
M
(ωnm)≥ exp
(
I
S (ωnm)
ε2
4B2
)
= exp
(
I
S (ωnm)
1
22r+2B2
)
for all m ∈ N. (10)
Consider any real R > 0 and m ∈N. Since ω ∈D, we know that limn→+∞ I S (ωn) = +∞,
so there is some natural number m′ ≥ m such that exp
(
I S (ωm
′
) 122r+2B2
)
> R. Hence it
follows from the statement in (10) that there is some nm′ ≥m′ ≥m—whence I S (ωnm′ )≥
I S (ωm
′
)—such that
F
(r)
M
(ωnm′ )≥ exp
(
I
S (ωnm′ )
1
22r+2B2
)
≥ exp
(
I
S (ωm
′
)
1
22r+2B2
)
> R,
which implies that limsupF (r)
M
(ω)=+∞. Observe that for this test supermartingale, F (r)
M
(x1:n)≤
( 32 )
n for all n ∈N0 and x1:n ∈X1:n.
Now define the process FM := ∑r∈N w(r)F (r)M as a countable convex combination of
the F (r)
M
constructed above, with positive weights w(r) > 0 that sum to one. This is a real
process, because each term in the series FM (x1:n) is non-negative, and moreover
FM (x1:n)≤ ∑
r∈N
w(r)F
(r)
M
≤ ∑
r∈N
w(r)
(3
2
)n
=
(3
2
)n
for all n ∈ N0 and x1:n ∈X1:n.
This process is also positive, has FM () = 1, and, for any ω ∈D∩A, it follows from the
argumentation above that there is some r ∈ N such that ω ∈ D∩Ar and therefore
limsupFM (ω)≥ w(r) limsupF
(r)
M
(ω) = +∞,
so limsupFM (ω) = +∞.
We now prove that FM is a supermartingale. Consider any n ∈N0 and any x1:n ∈X1:n,
then we have to prove that Q(−∆FM (x1:n)|x1:n)≥ 0. Since it follows from the argumenta-
tion in the proof of Lemma 9 that
−∆F (r)
M
(x1:n) =
1
2r+1B2
F
(r)
M
(x1:n)∆M (x1:n) for all r ∈ N,
we see that
−∆FM (x1:n) =− ∑
r∈N
w(r)∆F (r)
M
= ∆M (x1:n) ∑
r∈N
w(r)
2r+1B2
F
(r)
M
(x1:n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:c(x1:n)
,
where c(x1:n)≥ 0 must be a real number, because, using a similar argument as before
c(x1:n) = ∑
r∈N
w(r)
2r+1B2
F
(r)
M
(x1:n)≤ L ∑
r∈N
w(r)F
(r)
M
(x1:n)≤ L
(3
2
)n
for some real L > 0. Therefore indeed, using the non-negative homogeneity of lower ex-
pectations [LE3]:
Q(−∆FM (x1:n)|x1:n) = Q(c(x1:n)∆M (x1:n)|x1:n) = c(x1:n)Q(∆M (x1:n)|x1:n)≥ 0,
because M is a submartingale.
11One of the requirements in Lemma 9 is that 0 < ε < B, and this is satisfied because we made sure that
B > 1.
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Since we now know that FM is a supermartingale that is furthermore bounded below
(by 0) it follows from the supermartingale convergence theorem (Theorem 5) that there
is some test supermartingale T
M
that converges to +∞ on all paths where FM does not
converge to a real number, and therefore in particular on all paths in D∩A. Hence D∩A is
indeed strictly null. 
Lemma 9. Consider any real B > 0 and any 0 < ξ < 1B . Let M be any submartingale
such that |∆M | ≤ B. Let S be any real process that only assumes values in {0,1}. Then
the process FM defined by:
FM (x1:n) :=
n−1
∏
k=0
[
1− ξS (x1:k)∆M (x1:k)(xk+1)] for all n ∈N0 and x1:n ∈X1:n
is a positive supermartingale with FM () = 1, and therefore in particular a test super-
martingale. Moreover, for ξ := ε2B2 , with 0 < ε < B, we have that
〈M 〉S (x1:n)≤−ε ⇒FM (x1:n)≥ exp
(
I
S (x1:n)
ε2
4B2
)
for all n ∈ N0 and x1:n ∈X1:n.
Proof. FM () = 1 trivially. To prove that FM is positive, consider any n ∈ N and any
x1:n ∈X1:n. Since it follows from 0< ξ B< 1, |∆M | ≤B and S ∈{0,1} that 1−ξS (x1:k)∆M (x1:k)(xk+1)≥
1− ξ B > 0 for all 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 1, we see that indeed:
FM (x1:n) =
n−1
∏
k=0
[
1− ξS (x1:k)∆M (x1:k)(xk+1)] > 0.
Consider any n ∈ N0 and any x1:n ∈X1:n. For any xn+1 ∈Xn+1:
−∆FM (x1:n)(xn+1) = FM (x1:n)−FM (x1:n+1)
= ξS (x1:n)∆M (x1:n)(xn+1)
n−1
∏
k=0
[
1− ξS (x1:k)∆M (x1:k)(xk+1)]
= ξFM (x1:n)S (x1:n)∆M (x1:n)(xn+1),
implying that −∆FM (x1:n) = ξS (x1:n)FM (x1:n)∆M (x1:n). Since FM (x1:n) > 0, ξ >
0 and I S (x1:n) ∈ {0,1}, it follows directly from Q(∆M (x1:n)|x1:n) ≥ 0 and the non-
negative homogeneity property [LE3] of a lower expectation that Q(−∆FM (x1:n)|x1:n)≥
0—implying that FM is a supermartingale.
For the second statement, consider any 0 < ε < B and let ξ := ε2B2 . Then for any n∈N0
and x1:n ∈X1:n such that 〈M 〉S (x1:n)≤−ε , we have for all real K:
FM (x1:n)≥ exp(K)⇔
n−1
∏
k=0
[
1− ξS (x1:k)∆M (x1:k)(xk+1)]≥ exp(K)
⇔
n−1
∑
k=0
ln
[
1− ξS (x1:k)∆M (x1:k)(xk+1)] ≥ K. (11)
Since |∆M | ≤ B, S ∈ {0,1} and 0 < ε < B, we know that
−ξS (x1:k)∆M (x1:k)≥−ξ B =− ε2B >−
1
2
for 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 1.
As ln(1+ x)≥ x− x2 for x >− 12 , this allows us to infer that
n−1
∑
k=0
ln
[
1− ξS (x1:k)∆M (x1:k)(xk+1)]
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≥
n−1
∑
k=0
[
−ξS (x1:k)∆M (x1:k)(xk+1)− ξ 2S (x1:k)2(∆M (x1:k)(xk+1))2]
=−ξI S (x1:n)〈M 〉S (x1:n)− ξ 2
n−1
∑
k=0
S (x1:k)(∆M (x1:k)(xk+1))2
≥ ξI S (x1:n)ε − ξ 2I S (x1:n)B2 = I S (x1:n)ξ (ε − ξ B2) = I S (x1:n) ε
2
4B2
,
where the first equality holds because S 2 = S . Now choose K := I S (x1:n) ε
2
4B2 in Equa-
tion (11). 
5. PROPERTIES OF THE GLOBAL MODELS
In this section, we first consider the extension to extended real variables of the global
lower and upper expectations introduced in Section 3.4, and then prove a number of very
general and useful results for these extensions. Indeed, for a number of results and applica-
tions, it will be useful to extend the global models, introduced in formulae (3) and (4), from
bounded real variables (gambles on Ω) to extended ones; see for example the discussion
in Section 7, where we discuss transition and return times, which are unbounded and may
even become infinite.
Nevertheless, it should be stressed here that most of the discussion in this paper deals
only with bounded real variables. In particular, our results on ergodic theorems in Sec-
tions 8 and 9 do not rely on this extension.
We begin by proving alternative expressions for the global models for gambles.
Proposition 10. For any gamble g on Ω, and any situation s ∈ Ω♦:
E(g|s) = sup{M (s) : M ∈Mb and limsupM (ω)≤ g(ω) for all ω ∈ Γ(s)} (12)
E(g|s) = inf{M (s) : M ∈Mb and liminfM (ω)≥ g(ω) for all ω ∈ Γ(s)}. (13)
Proof. We only give the proof for the lower expectations, as the proof for the upper expec-
tations is completely similar. If we denote the right-hand side in Equation (12) by F(g|s),
then it follows trivially from Mb ⊆M that E(g|s)≥ F(g|s), so we concentrate on proving
the converse inequality E(g|s)≤ F(g|s).
If E(g|s) = −∞ then this inequality is trivially satisfied,12 so we may assume without
loss of generality that there is some M ∈M such that limsupM (s•) ≤ g(s•). Consider
any such submartingale M for which also M (t) = M (s) in any situation t that does not
follow s [to see that such a submartingale exists, simply consider that if we change the
values M ′(t) of any submartingale M ′ to M ′(s) in such situations t, the result is still a
submartingale]. It then follows from Lemma 1 that
M (v)≤ sup
ω∈Γ(s)
limsupM (ω)≤ sup
ω∈Γ(s)
g(ω)≤ supg
for all situations v that follow s, and, in particular, that M (s)≤ supg. For any situation that
does not follow s, this implies that M (v) = M (s) ≤ supg. Hence, M (v) ≤ supg for all
v ∈ Ω♦. Since supg ∈ R because g is a gamble and therefore bounded, this implies that
M ∈Mb, and the proof is complete. 
If we now simply replace the gambles ‘g’ in Equations (3) and (12) by extended real
variables ‘ f ’, we get two obvious candidate definitions for the conditional lower expecta-
tion E( f |s) of such f . The following example shows that the first candidate, which seems
to be the one suggested by Shafer and Vovk in their earlier work [16, Chapter 8.3], may
have a rather undesirable property.
12Note, by the way, that it will follow from LE*1 in Proposition 14 that this cannot actually happen.
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Example 1. Consider the precise probability tree that corresponds to repeatedly flipping a
fair coin, where all coin flips are independent. That is, let Xk := {0,1} for all k ∈N and let
Q(h|x1:n) = Q(h|x1:n) := 12 h(0)+
1
2
h(1) for all n ∈N0, h ∈ G (Xn+1) and x1:n ∈X1:n.
(14)
For any real α > 0, we consider a corresponding real process Mα , defined by Mα() :=α ,
∆Mα() := 2α(I{0}− I{1}) and, for all n ∈N and x1:n ∈X1:n:
∆Mα(x1:n) :=


3α2n−1(I{0}− I{1}) if xk = 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,n}
α2n−1(I{0}− I{1}) if xk = 1 for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,n}
0 otherwise.
It follows trivially from Equation (14) that this real process is both a sub- and a supermartin-
gale, and therefore also a martingale. For any given natural n ≥ 2 and x1:n ∈X1:n, we now
set out to find a closed-form expression for Mα(x1:n). We consider two cases: x1 = 0 and
x1 = 1. If x1 = 0, then there is at least one i∈ {1, . . . ,n} such that xk = 0 for all k∈ {1, . . . , i}.
Let imax be the largest such i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, and let i∗ := min{imax,n− 1}. Then
Mα(x1:n) = Mα()+
n−1
∑
k=0
∆Mα(x1:k)(xk+1)
= Mα()+∆Mα()(0)+
i∗−1
∑
k=1
∆Mα(x1:k)(xk+1)+∆Mα(x1:i∗)(xi∗+1)
= α + 2α +
i∗−1
∑
k=1
3α2k−1 + 3α2i∗−1
(
I{0}(xi∗+1)− I{1}(xi∗+1)
)
= 3α2i∗−1 + 3α2i∗−1
(
I{0}(xi∗+1)− I{1}(xi∗+1)
)
= 3α2i∗I{0}(xi∗+1).
If x1 = 1, then there is at least one j ∈ {1, . . . ,n} such that xk = 1 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , j}.
Let jmax be the largest such j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, and let j∗ := min{ jmax,n− 1}. Then, using an
argument similar to the one for the case x1 = 0, we find that
Mα(x1:n) = α − 2α−
j∗−1
∑
k=1
α2k−1 +α2 j∗−1
(
I{0}(x j∗+1)− I{1}(x j∗+1)
)
=−α2 j∗−1 +α2 j∗−1
(
I{0}(x j∗+1)− I{1}(x j∗+1)
)
=−α2 j∗I{1}(x j∗+1).
Since xi∗+1 = 0 if and only if imax = n, and similarly, x j∗+1 = 1 if and only if jmax = n, we
can combine the two cases above to find that, for all natural n ≥ 2 and x1:n ∈X1:n:
Mα(x1:n) =


3α2n−1 if xk = 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,n}
−α2n−1 if xk = 1 for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,n}
0 otherwise.
Now let f be the extended real variable that is defined by
f (ω) :=


+∞ if ω = 000000 . . .
−∞ if ω = 111111 . . .
0 otherwise
for all ω ∈ Ω.
Then clearly liminfMα = limsupMα = limMα = f .
We conclude from all of the above that, for any α > 0, we can construct a submartin-
gale Mα ∈M such that Mα() = α and limsupMα ≤ f . Therefore, if we were to apply
Equations (3) and (4) to f , with s =, we would find that
E ( f ) = sup{M () : M ∈M and limsupM ≤ f} =+∞
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and that E( f ) = −E(− f ) = −E( f ) = −∞, where the first equality follows from conju-
gacy and the second equality follows from a symmetry argument: E (− f ) is equal to E ( f )
because exchanging zeroes and ones in the tree (a) turns f into − f , and (b) leaves the
probability tree unchanged. We conclude that if we were to apply Equations (3) and (4) to
the extended real variable f , we would find that +∞ = E ( f ) > E ( f ) = −∞. We consider
this to be undesirable: any reasonable definition of lower and upper expectation should at
the very least guarantee that a lower expectation can never exceed the corresponding upper
expectation. 
This leaves us with the second candidate formula for extension, which is the one we will
use in this paper, and which is related to the one used in more recent work by Shafer and
Vovk [17, Section 2]:
E( f |s) :=sup{M (s) : M ∈Mb and limsupM (ω)≤ f (ω) for all ω ∈ Γ(s)} (15)
E( f |s) := inf{M (s) : M ∈Mb and liminfM (ω)≥ f (ω) for all ω ∈ Γ(s)} (16)
=−E(− f |s),
where f is any extended real variable, and s ∈ Ω♦ any situation. We will see further on
in Proposition 14 [in particular LE*5] that this definition does not lead to the undesirable
behaviour that Example 1 warns us about.
To investigate the properties of these extended global models, we first look at their be-
haviour on n-measurable extended real variables.
Proposition 11. For any situation x1:m ∈ Ω♦ and any n-measurable extended real vari-
able f , with n,m ∈N0 such that n ≥ m:13
E( f |x1:m) = sup{M (x1:m) : M ∈M and (∀xm+1:n ∈Xm+1:n)M (x1:n)≤ f (x1:n)}
E( f |x1:m) = inf{M (x1:m) : M ∈M and (∀xm+1:n ∈Xm+1:n)M (x1:n)≥ f (x1:n)}.
Proof. We sketch the idea of the proof of the equality for the lower expectations; the proof
for the upper expectations is completely similar. Denote, for simplicity of notation, the
right-hand side of the first equality by R.
First, consider any submartingale M such that M (x1:n)≤ f (x1:n) for all xm+1:n ∈Xm+1:n.
Consider the submartingale M ′ derived from M by keeping it constant as soon as any situ-
ation in {x1:m}×Xm+1:n is reached and letting M ′(t) =M (s) for any situation t that does
not follow s, then clearly M ′ is bounded above, limsupM ′(ω)≤ f (ω) for all ω ∈ Γ(x1:m),
and M (x1:m) =M ′(x1:m). Hence it follows from Equation (15) that M (x1:m)≤ E( f |x1:m),
whence also R ≤ E( f |x1:m).
For the converse inequality, consider any bounded above submartingale M such that
limsupM (ω) ≤ f (ω) for all ω ∈ Γ(x1:m). Fix any xm+1:n, then it follows from the n-
measurability of f that limsupM (ω)≤ f (x1:n) for all ω ∈ Γ(x1:n), whence
M (x1:n)≤ sup
ω∈Γ(x1:n)
limsupM (ω)≤ f (x1:n),
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 1 with s := x1:n. This implies that M (x1:m)≤
R, and therefore also E( f |x1:m)≤ R. 
Corollary 12. For any situation x1:m ∈Ω♦ and any n-measurable extended real variable f ,
with n,m ∈ N0 such that n ≥ m:
E( f |x1:m) = sup{E(g|x1:m) : g ∈ G (X1:n) and (∀xm+1:n ∈Xm+1:n)g(x1:n)≤ f (x1:n)}
E( f |x1:m) = inf{E(g|x1:m) : g ∈ G (X1:n) and (∀xm+1:n ∈Xm+1:n)g(x1:n)≥ f (x1:n)}.
13In these expressions, M may be replaced by Mb, and M by Mb, the proof remains essentially the same.
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Proof. We give the proof for the lower expectations; the proof for the upper expectations
is completely similar. Denote the right-hand side of the first equality by R, for notational
simplicity. It follows at once from Proposition 11 that E(g|x1:m) ≤ E( f |x1:m) for all g ∈
G (X1:n) such that g(x1:m,xm+1:n)≤ f (x1:m,xm+1:n) for all xm+1:n ∈Xm+1:n, and therefore
also R≤E( f |x1:m). Conversely, consider any submartingale M such that M (x1:m,xm+1:n)≤
f (x1:m,xm+1:n) for all xm+1:n ∈ Xm+1:n. If we define the n-measurable gamble g on Ω
by letting g(x1:n) := M (x1:n) for all x1:n ∈ X1:n, then it follows from Proposition 11 that
M (x1:m) ≤ E(g|x1:m), and since by assumption g(x1:m,xm+1:n) ≤ f (x1:m,xm+1:n) for all
xm+1:n ∈Xm+1:n, that E(g|x1:m)≤R. Hence M (x1:m)≤R, and therefore, by Proposition 11,
E( f |x1:m)≤ R. 
The following result extends Corollary 3.
Corollary 13. Consider any n ∈ N0, any situation x1:n ∈ Ω♦ and any (n+ 1)-measurable
extended real variable f . Then
E( f |x1:n) = sup{Q(h|x1:n) : h ∈ G (X ) and h ≤ f (x1:n ·)}
E( f |x1:n) = inf{Q(h|x1:n) : h ∈ G (X ) and h ≥ f (x1:n ·)}.
Proof. We give the proof for the lower expectation; the proof for the upper expectation is
completely similar. We infer from Proposition 11, the argumentation above and the defini-
tion of a submartingale that, indeed,
E( f |x1:n) = sup{α ∈ R : α + h≤ f (x1:n ·) for some h ∈ G (X ) such that Q(h|x1:n)≥ 0}
= sup{α ∈ R : h ≤ f (x1:n ·) for some h ∈ G (X ) such that α ≤ Q(h|x1:n)}
= sup{Q(h|x1:n) : h ∈ G (X ) and h ≤ f (x1:n ·)},
where the second equality follows from coherence [LE8]. 
We end this section by proving three interesting and very useful results about the global
models. The first summarises and extends properties first proved by Shafer and Vovk (see
for instance Refs. [16, Chapter 8.3], [17, Section 2] and [19, Section 6.3]), in showing that
these global models satisfy properties that extend the basic coherence axioms/properties
LE1–LE8 for lower and upper expectations from gambles to extended real maps. We pro-
vide, for the sake of completeness, proofs that are very close to the ones given by Shafer
and Vovk [17, Section 2].14
Proposition 14. Consider any situation s, any extended real variables f and g, and any
real numbers λ ≥ 0 and µ . Then
LE*1. E( f |s)≥ inf{ f (ω) : ω ∈ Γ(s)};
LE*2. E( f + g|s)≥ E( f |s)+E(g|s);
LE*3. E(λ f |s) = λ E( f |s);
LE*4. if f ≤ g on Γ(s) strictly almost surely, then E( f |s) ≤ E(g|s) and E( f |s) ≤ E(g|s);
as a consequence, if f = g on Γ(s) strictly almost surely, then E( f |s) = E(g|s) and
E( f |s) = E(g|s);
LE*5. inf{ f (ω) : ω ∈ Γ(s)} ≤ E( f |s) ≤ E( f |s)≤ sup{ f (ω) : ω ∈ Γ(s)};
LE*6. E( f + µ |s) = E( f |s)+ µ and E( f + µ |s) = E( f |s)+ µ .
In these expressions, as well as further on, we use the convention that ∞+∞ = ∞, −∞+
(−∞) =−∞, −∞+∞ = ∞+(−∞) =−∞, a+∞ = ∞+a = ∞, a+(−∞) =−∞+a =−∞
for all real a, and 0 ·±∞ =±∞ ·0 = 0.15
14Our proof of LE*5 corrects a small glitch in theirs. Our monotonicity property LE*4 is stronger, because it
only requires strictly almost sure, rather than point-wise, dominance.
15This is the extended addition that is convenient for working with lower expectations; for the dual upper
expectations, we need to introduce a dual operator, defined by a+∗ b := −[(−a)+ (−b)] for all extended real a
and b.
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Proof. LE*1. If inf{ f (ω) : ω ∈ Γ(s)} =−∞, then the inequality is trivially satisfied. Con-
sider therefore any real L ≤ inf{ f (ω) : ω ∈ Γ(s)}, and the submartingale M that assumes
the constant value L everywhere. Then surely M is bounded above, limsupM (s•) = L ≤
f (s•) and M (s) = L, so Equation (15) guarantees that indeed L ≤ E( f |s).
LE*2. When E( f |s) or E(g|s) are equal to −∞, so is their sum, and the inequality holds
trivially. Assume therefore that both E( f |s) > −∞ and E(g|s) > −∞. This implies that
there are bounded above submartingales M1 and M2 such that limsupM1(s•) ≤ f (s•)
and limsupM2(s•) ≤ g(s•). Consider any such submartingales M1 and M2, then it fol-
lows from the coherence [LE2] of the local models that M := M1 +M2 is a bounded
above submartingale as well. Since limsupM (s•)≤ limsupM1(s•)+ limsupM2(s•)≤
f (s•)+ g(s•),16 we infer from Equation (15) that indeed E( f + g|s)≥ E( f |s)+E(g|s).
LE*3. For λ > 0, simply observe that if M is a bounded above submartingale such
that limsupM (s•) ≤ f (s•), then also λM is a bounded above submartingale such that
limsup[λM (s•)]≤ λ f (s•), and vice versa. For λ = 0, we infer on the one hand from LE*1
and Lemma 1 that E(λ f |s) = E(0|s) = 0, and on the other hand we also know that 0 ·
E( f |s) = 0.
LE*4. Due to conjugacy, it suffices to prove the first inequality. It is trivially satisfied if
E( f |s) = −∞. Assume therefore that E( f |s) > −∞, meaning that there is some bounded
above submartingale M such that limsupM (s•) ≤ f (s•). Consider any such submartin-
gale M and any real ε > 0. It follows from the assumption and Theorem 5 that there
is some test supermartingale T ≥ 0 with T () = 1 that converges to +∞ on all paths
ω ∈ Γ(s) for which f (ω) > g(ω). If we let M ′ := M − εT , then M ′ is a bounded
above submartingale, M ′ ≤M and M ′(s) =M (s)−εT (s). Moreover, for any ω ∈ Γ(s),
limsupM ′(ω) = −∞ ≤ g(ω) if g(ω) < f (ω), and limsupM ′(ω) ≤ limsupM (ω) ≤
f (ω) ≤ g(ω) otherwise. Hence limsupM ′(s•) ≤ g(s•), so we infer from Equation (15)
that M (s)− εT (s) ≤ E(g|s), and therefore also E( f |s)− εT (s) ≤ E(g|s). Since this in-
equality holds for all ε > 0, we find that indeed E( f |s)≤ E(g|s).
LE*5. Suppose ex absurdo that E( f |s) > E( f |s) = −E(− f |s). This implies that also
E( f |s) +E(− f |s) > 0, but then LE*2 tells us that also E( f +(− f )|s) > 0. Now the ex-
tended real map f +(− f ) assumes only the values 0 and −∞, and therefore f +(− f )≤ 0,
so we infer from LE*4 that E( f +(− f )|s) ≤ E(0|s) = 0, where the last equality follows
from LE*3. This is a contradiction. The remaining inequalities are now trivial.
LE*6. Due to conjugacy, it suffices to prove the first equality. If M is a bounded above
submartingale such that limsupM (s•)≤ f (s•)+µ , then M −µ is a bounded above sub-
martingale such that limsup[M (s•)− µ ]≤ f (s•), and vice versa. 
Our second result follows immediately from the definition of the global lower expecta-
tions in Equation (15).
Proposition 15. Consider any extended real variable f and any n ∈ N0. Then
E( f (X1X2 . . . )|x1:n) = E( f (x1:nXn+1Xn+2 . . . )|x1:n).
Our third result can be seen as a generalisation of the law of iterated expectations—
or the law of total probability in expectation form—in classical probability theory. Our
formulation generalises a result by Shafer and Vovk [16, Proposition 8.7], whose proof
can only be guaranteed to work for bounded real variables; we provide a proof that is
better suited for dealing with extended real variables. In accordance with the notational
convention introduced in Section 3.3, we denote by E( f |X1:n) the extended real variable
that assumes the same value E( f |x1:n) on all paths ω = x1:n• that go through x1:n. It is
clearly n-measurable, and therefore only depends on the values of the first n states X1:n.
16The first inequality holds for bounded above submartingales, but may fail for more general ones. Indeed,
assume that on some path ω , M1(ωn) = 2n and M2(ωn) = −n. Then limsupM1(ω) = +∞, limsupM2(ω) =
−∞, and limsup[M1(ω)+M2(ω)] = +∞, so the inequality is violated.
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Theorem 16 (Law of iterated lower expectations). Consider any extended real variable f
and any n,m ∈ N0 such that n ≥ m. Then
E( f |X1:m) = E(E( f |X1:n)|X1:m).
Proof. Fix any z1:m ∈X1:m. We prove that E( f |z1:m) = E(E( f |X1:n)|z1:m), or equivalently,
by Proposition 15, that E( f |z1:m) = E(E( f |z1:mXm+1:n)|z1:m).
First, consider any bounded above submartingale M such that limsupM (z1:m •) ≤
f (z1:m •). Then also, for any xm+1:n ∈ Xm+1:n, limsupM (z1:mxm+1:n •) ≤ g(z1:mxm+1:n •),
which implies that, by Equation (15) for s := z1:mxm+1:n, M (z1:mxm+1:n)≤E( f |z1:mxm+1:n).
Hence M (z1:mXm+1:n)≤ E( f |z1:mXm+1:n), and therefore we can infer from Proposition 14
[LE*4 for s := z1:m] that E(M (z1:mXm+1:n)|z1:m) ≤ E(E( f |z1:mXm+1:n)|z1:m). Since it fol-
lows almost trivially from Proposition 11 that M (z1:m)≤E(M (z1:mXm+1:n)|z1:m), this also
implies that M (z1:m)≤E(E( f |z1:mXm+1:n)|z1:m). If we now use Equation (15) for s := z1:m,
we find that E( f |z1:m)≤ E(E( f |z1:mXm+1:n)|z1:m).
To prove the converse inequality, consider any h ∈ G (X1:n) such that h(z1:mxm+1:n) ≤
E( f |z1:mxm+1:n) for all xm+1:n ∈Xm+1:n. Fix any ε > 0. It then follows from Equation (15)
[with s := z1:mxm+1:n] that, for any xm+1:n ∈ Xm+1:n, there is some bounded above sub-
martingale Mxm+1:n such that
Mxm+1:n(z1:mxm+1:n)≥ h(z1:nxm+1:n)−
ε
2
and limsupMxm+1:n(z1:mxm+1:n •)≤ f (z1:mxm+1:n •).
Now consider any n-measurable real variable g such that
g(z1:mxm+1:n) = Mxm+1:n(z1:mxm+1:n)≥ h(z1:mxm+1:n)−
ε
2
for all xm+1:n ∈Xm+1:n,
then it follows from Proposition 11 that there is a submartingale M ′ such that M ′(z1:m)>
E(g|z1:m)− ε2 and M
′(z1:mxm+1:n)≤ g(z1:mxm+1:n) for all xm+1:n ∈Xm+1:n. Now consider
a submartingale M that assumes the constant value M ′(z1:m) in all situations t that do not
strictly follow z1:m—so M (t) =M ′(z1:m) for all t ∈Ω♦ such that z1:m 6⊏ t and, in particular,
M (z1:m) = M
′(z1:m)—and such that moreover
∆M (z1:mxm+1:k) =
{
∆M ′(z1:mxm+1:k) if k < n
∆Mxm+1:n(z1:mxm+1:k) if k ≥ n
for all k ≥ m and xm+1:k ∈Xm+1:k.
It then follows that M (z1:mxm+1:k)≤Mxm+1:n(z1:mxm+1:k) for all k≥ n and xm+1:k ∈Xm+1:k
and, therefore, we find that M is bounded above and that limsupM (z1:mxm+1:n•)≤ f (z1:mxm+1:n •)
for all xm+1:n ∈ Xm+1:n, which implies that limsupM (z1:m •) ≤ f (z1:m •), and therefore
also that E( f |z1:m)≥M (z1:m), by applying Equation (15) for s= z1:m. Since also M (z1:m)=
M ′(z1:m) > E(g|z1:m)− ε2 , we find that E( f |z1:m) > E(g|z1:m)− ε2 . Furthermore, since
g(z1:mXm+1:n)≥ h(z1:mXm+1:n)− ε2 , it follows from Proposition 15 and LE*4 that E(g|z1:m)=
E(g(z1:mXm+1:n)|z1:m) ≥ E(h(z1:mXm+1:n)− ε2 |z1:m) = E(h−
ε
2 |z1:m), which, due to LE*6,
implies that E(g|z1:m) ≥ E(h|z1:m)− ε2 . Hence, we find that E( f |z1:m) > E(h|z1:m)− ε .
Since this holds for any ε > 0, we find that E( f |z1:m) ≥ E(h|z1:m). Since this holds for
any h ∈ G (X1:n) such that h(z1:mxm+1:n)≤ E( f |z1:mxm+1:n) for all xm+1:n ∈Xm+1:n, it fol-
lows from Corollary 12 that E( f |z1:m)≥ E(E( f |z1:mXm+1:n)|z1:m). 
6. IMPRECISE MARKOV CHAINS
We are now ready to apply what we have learned in the previous sections to the spe-
cial case of (time-homogeneous) imprecise Markov chains. These are imprecise probabil-
ity trees where (i) all states Xk assume values in the same finite set Xk = X , called the
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state space, and (ii) all local uncertainty models satisfy the so-called (time-homogeneous)
Markov condition:
Q(·|x1:n) = Q(·|xn) for all situations x1:n ∈ Ω♦, (17)
meaning that these local models only depend on the last observed state; see Figure 3.
a
(a,a)
(a,a,a) (a,a,b)
(a,b)
(a,b,a) (a,b,b)
b
(b,a)
(b,a,a) (b,a,b)
(b,b)
(b,b,a) (b,b,b)
Q(·|)
Q(·|a) Q(·|b)
Q(·|a) Q(·|b)Q(·|a)Q(·|b)
FIGURE 3. The (initial part of the) imprecise probability tree for an im-
precise Markov process whose states can assume two values, a and b,
and can change at time instants n = 1,2,3, . . .
We refer to Refs. [7, 11, 20] for detailed studies of the behaviour of these processes. We
restrict ourselves here in Section 6.1 to a summary of the existing material in the literature
that is relevant for the discussion of ergodicity in later sections. As far as we can tell, all of
the current discussions and results about imprecise Markov chains deal with a finite time
horizon, and consider only bounded real variables (gambles). For this reason, we devote
some effort in Section 6.2 to broadening the discussion to an infinite time horizon, using
the expressions for the global conditional lower expectations that we introduced in Sec-
tion 3.4 and extended to extended real variables in Section 5. In Section 6.3, we discuss
the relationship between time shifts and lower expectation operators in imprecise Markov
chains and use these results to characterise their potential stationarity.
We believe it is important to explain at this point how our imprecise Markov chains
are related to their precise counterparts. Recall from the discussion in Section 3.4 that the
expressions for the lower and upper expectations in Proposition 2 have an interesting in-
terpretation in terms of (precise) probability trees [3]: (i) the imprecise probability tree for
an imprecise Markov chain corresponds to a collection of compatible precise probability
trees with the same event tree, by associating with each situation x1:n in the event tree some
arbitrarily chosen precise local expectation Q(·|x1:n) in the convex closed set M(Q(·|xn))
of expectations that are compatible with the local lower expectation Q(·|xn); and (ii) for
any n-measurable gamble f on Ω, the global precise expectations in the compatible precise
probability trees will then range over a closed interval whose lower and upper bounds are
given by the expressions in Proposition 11. It should be clear that the local precise models
Q(·|x1:n) need not satisfy the Markov condition,17 in contradistinction with the collections
M(Q(·|xn)) of precise models they are chosen from. In other words, imprecise Markov
chains are not simply collections of precise Markov chains, but rather correspond to collec-
tions of general stochastic processes whose local models belong to sets whose lower and
upper envelopes satisfy a Markov condition.
6.1. Lower transition operators and Perron–Frobenius-like behaviour. We can use
the local uncertainty models to introduce a (generally non-linear) transformation T of the
set G (X ) of all gambles on the state space X . The so-called lower transition operator of
the imprecise Markov chain is given by:
T : G (X )→ G (X ) : f 7→ T f ,
17
. . . in either its time-homogeneous or time-inhomogeneous form.
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where T f is the gamble on X defined by
T f (x) := Q( f |x) for all x ∈X .
The conjugate upper transition operator T is defined by T f :=−T(− f ) for all f ∈ G (X ).
In particular, TI{y}(x) is the lower probability to go from state value x to state value y in
one time step, and TI{y}(x) the conjugate upper probability. This seems to suggest that the
lower/upper transition operators T are generalisations of the concept of a Markov transition
matrix for ordinary Markov chains. This is confirmed by the following result, proved in
Ref. [7, Corollary 3.3] as a special case of the law of iterated (lower) expectations [3, 16];
see also Corollary 22 further on for a more general formulation. If, for any n ∈ N and any
f ∈ G (X ), we denote by En( f ) the value of the (global) lower expectation E ( f (Xn)) of
the real variable f (Xn) that only depends on the state Xn at time n, then
En( f ) = E1(T n−1 f ), with T n−1 f := TT . . .T︸ ︷︷ ︸
n− 1 times
f ,
and where, of course, E1 = Q(·|) is the marginal local model for the state X1 at time 1. In
a similar vein, for any n ∈N0, T nI{y}(x) is the lower probability to go from state value x to
state value y in n time steps, and T nI{y}(x) the conjugate upper probability.
We can formally call lower transition operator any transformation T of G (X ) such that
for any x ∈ X , the real functional T x on G (X ), defined by T x( f ) := T f (x) for all f ∈
G (X ), is a lower expectation—satisfies the coherence axioms LE1–LE3. The composition
of any two lower transition operators is again a lower transition operator. See Ref. [7]
for more details on the definition and properties of such lower transition operators, and
Ref. [5] for a mathematical discussion of the general role of these operators in imprecise
probabilities.
We call a lower transition operator T Perron–Frobenius-like if for all f ∈ G (X ), the
sequence of gambles T n f converges point-wise to a constant real number, which we will
then denote by EPF( f ). An imprecise Markov chain is said to be Perron–Frobenius-like if
its lower transition operator is.
The following result was proved in Ref. [7, Theorem 5.1], together with a simple suf-
ficient (and quite weak) condition on T for a Markov chain to be Perron–Frobenius-like:
there is some n ∈N such that minT nI{y} > 0 for all y ∈X , or in other words, all state val-
ues can be reached from any state value with positive upper probability in (precisely) n time
steps. More involved necessary and sufficient conditions were given later in Refs. [11, 20];
see also Theorem 29(iv) further on.
Proposition 17 ([7]). A lower transition operator T is Perron–Frobenius-like if and only
if there is some real functional E
∞
on G (X ) such that for any initial model E1 and any
f ∈ G (X ), it holds that E1(T n−1 f )→ E∞( f ). Moreover, in that case the functional E∞
is a lower expectation on G (X ), called the stationary lower expectation, it coincides with
EPF, and it is the only lower expectation that is T -invariant in the sense that E∞ ◦T = E∞.
6.2. Properties of the global lower expectations. The global lower and upper expecta-
tions introduced in Section 3.4 and extended in Section 5 have special properties when we
restrict ourselves to imprecise Markov chains. We explore them in this section.
We begin with a few preliminary remarks. In this context, we can identify Ω with X N
and paths ω with elements of X N. We will do so freely from now on. Similarly, any
situation s 6= can be identified with some sequence of states x1:n ∈X1:n for some n ∈ N.
Recalling that X1:n = X n allows us to concatenate situations s with other situations t
into new situations st; the initial situation works as the neutral element for this operation.
We can also concatenate situations s and paths ω into new paths sω . This allows us to
use a situation s to construct a new variable g := f (s•) from a variable f by letting
g(ω) := f (sω) for all ω ∈ Ω
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We say that a variable g does not depend on the first n states X1:n—with n ∈ N0 if
g(s•) = g(t •) for all s, t ∈X1:n,
which of course implies that there is some variable f such that g(s•) = f for all s ∈X1:n.
We assume that we have an imprecise Markov chain with marginal model Q(·|) and
transition models Q(·|x), x ∈X , or equivalently, a lower transition operator T.
We first extend these local transition models from bounded to extended real maps. In
accordance with what we have found in Corollary 13, we extend the local models Q(·|x)
and the corresponding lower transition operator T to extended real maps g : X → R∗ on
X by letting
Tg(x) := Q(g|x) := sup{Q(h|x) : h ∈ G (X ) and h ≤ g} for all x ∈X . (18)
That this is indeed an extension follows from the monotonicity [LE4] of Q(·|x).
Similarly to what we did in the previous section, for any n ∈ N and any extended real
map g on X , we denote by En(g) the value of the (global) lower expectation E (g(Xn))
of the extended real variable g(Xn) that only depends on the state Xn at time n: En(g) :=
E (g(Xn)) = E(g(Xn)|). Recall as a special case of Corollary 13 [for n = 0] that for any
extended real map g on X :
E1(g) = E(g(X1)|) = sup{Q(h|) : h ∈ G (X ) and h ≤ g}. (19)
Also, when the lower transition operator T is Perron–Frobenius-like, and therefore has
a unique stationary lower expectation E
∞
on G (X ), we can extend this lower expectation
to extended real maps g on X by similarly letting
E
∞
(g) := sup{E
∞
(h) : h ∈ G (X ) and h ≤ g}. (20)
This extended functional then satisfies a similar invariance property:
Proposition 18. Assume that T is Perron–Frobenius-like. Then E
∞
(g) = E
∞
(Tg) for any
extended real map g on X .
Proof. Observe that
E
∞
(g) = sup{E
∞
(h) : h ∈ G (X ) and h ≤ g}
≤ sup{E
∞
(h) : h ∈ G (X ) and Th ≤ Tg}
= sup{E
∞
(Th) : h ∈ G (X ) and Th ≤ Tg}
≤ sup{E
∞
(h′) : h′ ∈ G (X ) and h′ ≤ Tg}= E
∞
(Tg),
where the first inequality follows because h ≤ g implies that Th ≤ Tg [use Equation (18)],
the second equality because E
∞
(h) = E
∞
(Th) [use Proposition 17], and the last inequality
because Th ∈ G (X ) [LE5].
For the converse inequality E
∞
(Tg) ≤ E
∞
(g), fix any ε > 0. We may assume without
loss of generality that there is some h∈ G (X ) such that h≤ Tg: otherwise E
∞
(Tg) =−∞
by Equation (20), and the converse inequality holds trivially. So consider any such h. Since
X is finite, it follows from Equation (18) and the monotonicity of T [which follows easily
from Equation (18)] that there is some hε ∈ G (X ) such that hε ≤ g and h ≤ Thε + ε .
The monotonicity and constant additivity of E
∞
[which follow easily from Equation (20)]
then imply that E
∞
(h) ≤ E
∞
(Thε)+ ε and E∞(hε) ≤ E∞(g), whence, since E∞(Thε) =
E
∞
(hε) [use Proposition 17] also E∞(h) ≤ E∞(g)+ ε . Since this inequality holds for any
h∈G (X ) such that h≤Tg, it follows from Equation (20) that E
∞
(Tg)≤E
∞
(g)+ε . Since
this inequality holds for all ε > 0, we are done. 
We are now ready to start our analysis. Our first, basic result is a Markov property for
the global models. It states that all global conditional models are completely determined
by the global conditional models E(·|x), x ∈X :
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Proposition 19 (Markov property for global models). Consider any extended real variable
f , any situation s ∈ Ω♦ and any x ∈X , then
E( f |sx) = E( f (s•)|x).
A perhaps more familiar way of writing this is E( f (X1X2 . . . )|sx) = E( f (sX1X2 . . .)|x).
Proof. Consider, for ease of notation, the extended real variable g := f (s•). Consider any
bounded above submartingale M such that limsupM (sx•) ≤ f (sx•), and let M ′ be the
real process defined by M ′(u) :=M (su) for all u∈Ω♦. M ′ is clearly a bounded above sub-
martingale because M is, and moreoverM ′(x)=M (sx) and limsupM ′(x•)= limsupM (sx•)≤
f (sx•) = g(x•), whence, by Equation (15)
E( f |sx) = sup{M (sx) : M ∈Mb and limsupM (sx•)≤ f (sx•)}
≤ sup{M ′(x) : M ′ ∈Mb and limsupM ′(x•)≤ g(x•)}= E(g|x).
Conversely, consider any bounded above submartingale M such that limsupM (x•) ≤
g(x•), and let M ′ be the real process defined by letting M ′(sxu) := M (xu) for all u ∈
Ω♦, and letting M ′(t) := M (sx) in all situations t that do not follow sx. Then M ′ is
clearly a bounded above submartingale because M is, and moreover M ′(sx) = M (x) and
limsupM ′(sx•) = limsupM (x•)≤ g(x•) = f (sx•), whence, again by Equation (15)
E(g|x) = sup{M (x) : M ∈Mb and limsupM (x•)≤ g(x•)}
≤ sup{M ′(sx) : M ′ ∈Mb and limsupM ′(sx•)≤ f (sx•)} = E( f |sx). 
This allows us to introduce a new notation E |n(g|x) for conditional lower expectations of
extended real variables g that do not depend on the first n− 1 states X1:n−1, with n ∈N:
E |n(g|x) := E(g|sx) = E(g(s•)|x),
where s is any situation of length n−1. Obviously, E |n(g|·) is an extended real-valued map
on X .
We can now prove a number of related corollaries to our general law of iterated lower
expectations, formulated in Theorem 16.
Corollary 20. Let n ∈ N and k ∈ N0, and consider any extended real variable g that does
not depend on the first n+ k− 1 states. Then
E |n(g|·) = T kE |n+k(g|·).
Proof. It clearly suffices to give the proof for k = 1. So consider any extended real variable
g that does not depend on the first n states, and any x ∈ X . We prove that E |n(g|x) =
Q(E |n+1(g|·)|x).
Consider any x1:n−1 ∈X1:n−1, then it follows from Theorem 16 and Proposition 15 that
E(g|x1:n−1x) = E(E(g|X1:n+1)|x1:n−1x) = E(E(g|x1:n−1xXn+1)|x1:n−1x). (21)
Because g in particular does not depend on the first n−1 states, we see that for the left-hand
side of this equality: E(g|x1:n−1x) =E |n(g|x). We now look at the right-hand side. Consider
the extended real map h := E(g|x1:n−1x ·) on X and the n+ 1-measurable extended real
variable h(Xn+1) = E(g|x1:n−1xXn+1), then we see that
E(E(g|x1:n−1xXn+1)|x1:n−1x) = E(h(Xn+1)|x1:n−1x)
= sup{Q(h′|x1:n−1x) : h′ ∈ G (X ) and h′ ≤ h}
= sup{Q(h′|x) : h′ ∈ G (X ) and h′ ≤ h}= Q(h|x),
where the second equality follows from Corollary 13, the third from the Markov prop-
erty (17) of the local models, and the last from Equation (18). To complete the proof, con-
sider that, since g does not depend on the first n states, h= E(g|x1:n−1x ·) = E |n+1(g| ·). 
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Corollary 21. Let ℓ ∈ N and consider any extended real variable g that does not depend
on the first ℓ− 1 states. Then:
E (g) = E1(T ℓ−1E |ℓ(g|·)).
Proof. It follows from Corollary 20 with n = 1 and k = ℓ− 1 that E |1(g|·) = T ℓ−1E |ℓ(g|·).
Furthermore, by applying Theorem 16 [for m := 0 and n := 1], we find that E(g)=E (E(g|X1)).
This establishes the proof because it follows from the definition of E1 and E |1(g|·) that
E (E(g|X1)) = E1(E |1(g|·)). 
Corollary 22. Consider any n ∈ N and any extended real map f on X . Then En( f ) =
Ek(T n−k f ) = E1(T n−1 f ) for any 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
Proof. We use Corollary 21 with ℓ := n and g := f (Xn), leading to
En( f ) = E (g) = E1(T n−1E |n(g|·)),
since the extended real variable g only depends on the n-the state Xn, and therefore does not
depend on the first n−1 states. For the same reason, we see that for any x ∈X , E |n(g|x) =
E(g|sx)=E(g(sxXn+1 . . .)|sx) =E( f (x)|sx) = f (x), where s is any situation of length n−1,
and where the second equality follows from Proposition 15, and the last from coherence
property LE*5. Hence En( f ) = E1(T n−1 f ). Now consider any natural k ≤ n, then we find
in a similar manner that Ek( f ) = E1(T k−1 f ) and therefore also
E1(T n−1 f ) = E1(T k−1T n−k f ) = Ek(T n−k f ). 
6.3. Shift invariance. We introduce the shift operator θ on N by letting θ (n) := n+1 for
all n ∈ N. This induces a shift operator on Ω: θω is the path with (θω)n := ωθ(n) = ωn+1
for all n ∈ N. And this also induces a shift operation on variables f : θ f is the variable
defined by (θ f )(ω) := f (θω) for all ω ∈ Ω.
Proposition 23. Let n ∈N0. If the variable g does not depend on the first n states, then θg
does not depend on the first n+ 1 states.
Proof. Assume g does not depend on the first n states, so there is some variable f such that
g(s•) = f for all s ∈X1:n, where of course X1:n = X n. Then for all x ∈X , s ∈X n and
all ω ∈ Ω:
(θg)(xsω) = g(θ (xsω)) = g(sω) = f (ω),
which concludes the proof. 
We call a variable f shift invariant if θ f = f , meaning that
f (ω) = f (θω) for all ω ∈ Ω.
Proposition 24. A shift invariant variable f does not depend on the first n states X1:n, for
all n ∈ N0.
Proof. Immediate consequence of Proposition 23. 
Another way to understand that a variable f does not depend on the first n states, is that
then f (ω) = f (sθ nω) for all s ∈X1:n and ω ∈Ω, which we also write as f = f (sθ n •) for
all s ∈X1:n.
The following propositions tell us that the global lower expectations satisfy a shift in-
variance property.
Proposition 25. Let n ∈N and consider any extended real variable g that does not depend
on the first n− 1 states. Then for all k ∈N0:
E |n(g|·) = E |n+k(θ kg|·).
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Proof. It clearly suffices to prove the statement for k = 1. So consider any s ∈ X1:n−1
[recall that X1:n−1 = X n−1] and any x,y ∈ X , then it follows from Proposition 19 that
E |n(g|x) = E(g|sx) = E(g(s•)|x) and E |n+1(θg|x) = E(θg|ysx) = E(θg(ys•)|x). Now ob-
serve that θg(ys•) = g(θ (ys•)) = g(s•). 
Proposition 26. For any extended real variable f and any n ∈N0:
E (θ n f ) = En+1(E |1( f |·)).
Proof. Since θ n f does not depend on the first n states [see Proposition 23], we infer from
Corollary 21 [with ℓ := n+ 1] and Proposition 25 that indeed
E (θ n f ) = E1(T nE |n+1(θ n f |·)) = E1(T nE |1( f |·)) = En+1(E |1( f |·)),
where the last equality follows from En+1 = E1 ◦Tn [see Corollary 22]. 
As a generalisation of the case for precise Markov chains, we can call an imprecise
Markov chain stationary or time invariant if
E ( f ) = E (θ f ) for all extended real variables f .
The following proposition gives a simple characterisation of stationarity.
Proposition 27 (Stationarity). Consider an imprecise Markov chain with marginal lower
expectation E1 and lower transition operator T that is Perron–Frobenius-like with station-
ary lower expectation E
∞
. Then the imprecise Markov chain is stationary if and only if
E
∞
= E1.
Proof. Assume that E
∞
= E1, then E2 = E1◦T = E∞◦T = E∞ = E1, where the first equal-
ity follows from Corollary 22, and the one but last equality from Proposition 18. Hence it
follows from Proposition 26 and Corollary 21 [with ℓ := 1] that for any extended real vari-
able f , E (θ f ) = E2(E |1( f |·)) = E1(E |1( f |·)) = E ( f ). Hence the imprecise Markov chain
is stationary.
Assume, conversely, that the imprecise Markov chain is stationary. Let h be any gamble
on X , and consider the real variables f := h(X1) and θ f = h(X2). Then on the one hand
E ( f ) = E1(h), and on the other hand E (θ f ) = E2(h), so it follows from Corollary 22
[with n := 2] and stationarity that E1 ◦T = E2 = E1. So E1 is T-invariant, which implies
that E1 = E∞ [use Proposition 17 to get the equality for gambles, which also implies the
equalities for their extensions, via Equations (19) and (20)]. 
We gather from Proposition 27 that, with any Perron–Frobenius-like lower transition oper-
ator T and associated stationary lower expectation E
∞
, there always corresponds a unique
stationary imprecise Markov chain; its initial model is given by Q(·|) := E
∞
. We will
denote its corresponding (shift-invariant) global lower expectation operator by Est.
7. TRANSITION AND RETURN TIMES
Let us now look at lower (and upper) expected transition and return times, as a simple
and elegant example of what can be done using our extensions of the joint lower and upper
expectations to an infinite time horizon and extended real variables, and their properties,
discussed in the previous section.
Consider two (possibly identical) state values x and y in X . Suppose that the imprecise
Markov chain starts out at time n in state value x, then we can ask ourselves how long it
will take for it to reach the state value y, and when y = x, for the imprecise Markov chain
to return to the state value x. To study this, we introduce the extended real variables τnx→y
given by:
τnx→y(ω) :=
{
0 if ωn 6= x
inf{m ∈ N : ωn+m = y} if ωn = x.
(22)
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Observe that θτnx→y = τn+1x→y. Consider the lower expected time E(τnx→y|sx), where s is any
situation of length n− 1. Then, since τnx→y clearly does not depend on the first n− 1 states,
we infer from Proposition 19 [the Markov property] that E(τnx→y|sx) = E(τnx→y(s•)|x) =
E |n(τnx→y|x). Moreover, we infer from Proposition 25 that
E |n+1(τn+1x→y|x) = E |n+1(θτnx→y|x) = E |n(τnx→y|x),
so we conclude that E(τnx→y|sx) neither depends on the initial segment s, nor on its length
n−1. A similar conclusion holds for E(τnx→y|sx). We therefore define the lower and upper
expected transition times from x to y as
τx→y := E(τ
1
x→y|x) = E |n(τnx→y|x) and τx→y := E(τ1x→y|x) = E |n(τnx→y|x). (23)
When y = x, we talk about return times rather than transition times. It follows from LE*5
that τx→y ≥ τx→y ≥ 1.
On any path xX2 • that starts in x, the following recursion equation is satisfied:
τ1x→y(xX2 •) :=
{
1 if X2 = y
1+ τ2z→y(xz•) if X2 = z 6= y
= 1+∑
z 6=y
I{z}(X2)τ2z→y(xz•), (24)
using our convention that 0 ·+∞ = 0. We know from Theorem 16 and Proposition 15 that
τx→y = E(τ
1
x→y|x) = E(E(τ
1
x→y|xX2)|x). (25)
Moreover, for any z ∈ X \ {y}, we infer from Equation (24), Proposition 15 [repeatedly]
and coherence [LE*6] that
E(τ1x→y|xz) = E(τ1x→y(xzX3 . . . )|xz) = E(1+ τ2z→y(xzX3 . . . )|xz)
= 1+E(τ2z→y(xzX3 . . . )|xz) = 1+E(τ2z→y|xz) = 1+ τz→y,
Similarly, we infer from Equation (24), Proposition 15 and coherence [LE*5] that
E(τ1x→y|xy) = E(τ
1
x→y(xyX3 . . . )|xy) = E(1|xy) = 1.
Hence
E(τ1x→y|xX2) = 1+ ∑
z∈X \{y}
I{z}(X2)τ z→y,
and if we plug this expression into the local conditional expectation on the right-hand side
of Equation (25), and use coherence [LE*6], Corollary 13 and Equation 18, we are led to
the following system of non-linear equations for the lower transition (and return) times:
τx→y = 1+T
(
∑
z∈X \{y}
I{z}τ z→y
)
(x) for all x,y ∈X . (26)
A completely analogous argument leads to the corresponding system for the upper transi-
tion and return times:
τx→y = 1+T
(
∑
z∈X \{y}
I{z}τ z→y
)
(x) for all x,y ∈X . (27)
Finding a general solution to these systems is a difficult task, which we will not tackle here;
for the special case of imprecise birth-death chains, see Ref. [13].
We end this section by solving the following simple binary case. Let X = {a,b} and
let
Th(x) = E1(h) = (1− ε)
h(a)+ h(b)
2
+ ε minh for all h ∈ G (X ) and x ∈X , (28)
with ε ∈ (0,1). It is clear that T nh = E1(h) and therefore this imprecise Markov chain is
Perron–Frobenius-like, with E
∞
= E1, so it is stationary as well; see Proposition 27. Since
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the transition model Q(·|x) = E1 is the same for all state values x∈X , this is an imprecise-
probabilistic version of a Bernoulli (iid) process,18 with
θ a = 1−θb := E1(I{a}) =
1
2
−
ε
2
and θa = 1−θb := E1(I{a}) =
1
2
+
ε
2
.
In this simple binary case, Equation (26) can be significantly simplified. For example, for
y = a and any x ∈ {a,b}, we find that
τx→a = 1+T(I{b}τb→a)(x) = 1+E1(I{b}τb→a) = 1+τb→aE1(I{b}) = 1+τb→aθ b, (29)
where the second equality follows from Equation (28) and the third one from coherence
[LE3] and the following lemma.
Lemma 28. Consider a binary imprecise Markov chain with state space X = {a,b}whose
local models are given by Equation (28), with ε ∈ (0,1). Then 1 ≤ τb→a ≤ τb→a <+∞.
Proof. Since ε ∈ (0,1), it follows that θ a > 0. Consider the real process M defined by
M () := 1/θ a, ∆M () := 0 and, for all n ∈ N and x1:n ∈X1:n:
∆M (x1:n) :=
{
1− I{a}1/θa if xk = b for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,n}
0 otherwise.
(30)
Since coherence implies that E1(0) = 0 and
E1(1− I{a}1/θ a) = 1+E1(−I{a}1/θ a) = 1−E1(I{a}1/θ a) = 1− 1/θ aE1(I{a}) = 0,
it follows from from Equations (28) and (30) that M is a supermartingale.
Consider now any n ∈ N and x1:n ∈X1:n. If xk = b for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, we have that
M (x1:n) = M ()+∆M ()+
n−1
∑
k=1
∆M (x1:k) = 1/θ a + 0+(n− 1)= 1/θ a + n− 1.
Otherwise, we find that
M (x1:n) = M ()+∆M ()+
k∗−1
∑
k=1
∆M (x1:k) = 1/θ a + 0+(k∗− 1− 1/θa) = k∗− 1,
where k∗ is the smallest index k such that xk = a. Hence, we find that the supermartingale
M is bounded below by zero and therefore belongs to Mb, and that
liminfM (ω) =
{
+∞ if ωk = b for all k ∈ N
inf{k ∈ N : ωk = a}− 1 otherwise
(31)
for all ω ∈Ω.
For all ω ∈ Γ(b), Equations (22) and (31) now imply that liminfM (ω) = τ1b→a(ω).
Hence, since M ∈Mb, it follows from Equation (16) that
τb→a := E(τ
1
b→a|b)≤M (b) = M ()+∆M ()(b) = 1/θ a <+∞.
We also already know that 1 ≤ τb→a ≤ τb→a—see the text after Equation (23). 
Since the lemma tells us that τb→a is real-valued, we can now solve Equation (29) for
x = b to find that τb→a = 1/θ a. Equation (29) also implies that τb→a = τa→a. Hence, also
using the symmetry, we obtain the following expressions for the lower transition and return
times:
τa→a = τb→a =
1
θ a
=
2
1+ ε
and τb→b = τa→b =
1
θ b
=
2
1+ ε
.
18There are various ways to generalise a Bernoulli process to an imprecise probabilities context; see Ref. [2]
for discussion.
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An analogous argument—simplifying Equation (27) for y = a, solving the resulting
system to find τb→a and τa→a, and then invoking symmetry—leads to the following similar
expressions for the upper transition and return times:
τa→a = τb→a =
1
θ a
=
2
1− ε
and τb→b = τa→b =
1
θ b
=
2
1− ε
.
8. AN INTERESTING EQUALITY IN IMPRECISE MARKOV CHAINS
We now prove an interesting equality for imprecise Markov chains, which will be instru-
mental in proving our point-wise ergodic theorem in the next section.
Consider, for any f ∈ G (X ), the corresponding gain process W [ f ], defined by:
W [ f ](X1:n) := [ f (X1)−E1( f )]+
n
∑
k=2
[ f (Xk)−T f (Xk−1)] for any n ∈N, (32)
the corresponding average gain process 〈W 〉[ f ], defined by:
〈W 〉[ f ](X1:n) := 1
n
[
[ f (X1)−E1( f )]+
n
∑
k=2
[ f (Xk)−T f (Xk−1)]
]
for any n ∈ N, (33)
and the ergodic average process A [ f ], defined by:
A [ f ](X1:n) := 1
n
n
∑
k=1
[ f (Xk)−Ek( f )] for any n ∈N. (34)
We define these processes to be 0 in the initial situation. Now observe that, for any n∈N
and any f ∈ G (X ):
n−1
∑
ℓ=0
〈W 〉[T ℓ f ](X1:n) = 1
n
n−1
∑
ℓ=0
[
T ℓ f (X1)−E1(T ℓ f )
]
+
1
n
n−1
∑
ℓ=0
n
∑
k=2
[
T ℓ f (Xk)−T ℓ+1 f (Xk−1)
]
,
(35)
and moreover
n−1
∑
ℓ=0
n
∑
k=2
[
T ℓ f (Xk)−Tℓ+1 f (Xk−1)
]
=
n−1
∑
ℓ=0
n
∑
k=2
T ℓ f (Xk)−
n−1
∑
ℓ=0
n
∑
k=2
T ℓ+1 f (Xk−1) =
n−1
∑
ℓ=0
n
∑
k=2
T ℓ f (Xk)−
n
∑
ℓ=1
n−1
∑
k=1
T ℓ f (Xk)
=
n
∑
k=2
f (Xk)+
n−1
∑
ℓ=1
(
T ℓ f (Xn)+
n−1
∑
k=2
T ℓ f (Xk)
)
−
n−1
∑
k=1
T n f (Xk)−
n−1
∑
ℓ=1
(
T ℓ f (X1)+
n−1
∑
k=2
T ℓ f (Xk)
)
=
n
∑
k=2
f (Xk)+
n−1
∑
ℓ=1
T ℓ f (Xn)−
n−1
∑
k=1
T n f (Xk)−
n−1
∑
ℓ=1
T ℓ f (X1)
=
n
∑
k=1
f (Xk)+
n
∑
ℓ=1
T ℓ f (Xn)−
n
∑
k=1
T n f (Xk)−
n−1
∑
ℓ=0
T ℓ f (X1),
and if we substitute this back into Equation (35), we find that, after getting rid of the can-
celling terms, recalling that E1(T ℓ f ) = Eℓ+1( f ), and reorganising a bit:
n−1
∑
ℓ=0
〈W 〉[T ℓ f ](X1:n) = 1
n
[
−
n−1
∑
ℓ=0
E1(T ℓ f )+
n
∑
k=1
f (Xk)+
n
∑
ℓ=1
T ℓ f (Xn)−
n
∑
k=1
T n f (Xk)
]
=
1
n
n
∑
k=1
[ f (Xk)−Ek( f )]+
1
n
n
∑
ℓ=1
T ℓ f (Xn)− 1
n
n
∑
k=1
T n f (Xk)
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or in other words:
A [ f ](X1:n) =
n−1
∑
ℓ=0
〈W 〉[T ℓ f ](X1:n)+ 1
n
n
∑
k=1
T n f (Xk)− 1
n
n
∑
ℓ=1
T ℓ f (Xn). (36)
This is an important relationship between the ergodic average and the average gain. We
now intend to show that under certain conditions the remaining terms on the right-hand
side essentially cancel out for large enough n.
9. CONSEQUENCES OF THE PERRON–FROBENIUS-LIKE CHARACTER
Let us associate with a lower transition operator T the following (weak) coefficient of
ergodicity [11, 20]:
ρ(T) := max
x,y∈X
max
h∈G1(X )
|Th(x)−Th(y)|= max
h∈G1(X )
‖Th‖v,
where G1(X ) := {h ∈ G (X ) : 0 ≤ h ≤ 1}, and where for any h ∈ G (X ), its variation
(semi)norm is given by ‖h‖v := maxh−minh. If we define the following distance between
two lower expectation operators E and F [20]:
d(E,F) = max
h∈G1(X )
|E(h)−F(h)|,
then it is not difficult to see [using LE3, LE5 and LE8] that 0 ≤ d(E,F) ≤ 1, and that for
any f ∈ G (X ):
|E( f )−F( f )| ≤ d(E,F)‖ f‖v. (37)
Škulj and Hable [20] prove the following results, which will turn out to be crucial to our
argument.
Theorem 29 ([20]). Consider lower transition operators S and T , and two lower expecta-
tions Ea and Eb on G (X ). Then the following statements hold:
(i) 0 ≤ ρ(T)≤ 1.
(ii) ρ(ST)≤ ρ(S)ρ(T) and therefore ρ(Tn)≤ ρ(T)n for all n ∈ N.
(iii) d(EaT ,EbT)≤ d(Ea,Eb)ρ(T).
(iv) The lower transition operator T is Perron–Frobenius-like if and only if there is some
r ∈ N such that ρ(T r)< 1.
Indeed, they allow us to derive useful bounds for the various terms on the right-hand side of
Equation (36). For any non-negative real number a we denote by ⌊a⌋= max{n ∈ N0 : n ≤
a} the largest natural number that it still dominates—its integer part.
Lemma 30. Let T be a Perron–Frobenius-like lower transition operator, with invariant
lower expectation E
∞
, and let r be the smallest natural number such that ρ := ρ(T r) < 1.
Let Ea and Eb be any two lower expectations on G (X ). Then for all f ∈ G (X ), ℓ1, ℓ2 ∈
N0: ∣∣Ea(T ℓ1 f )−Eb(T ℓ2 f )∣∣≤ ‖ f‖vρ⌊min{ℓ1,ℓ2}r ⌋. (38)
As a consequence, for all f ∈ G (X ), ℓ,ℓ1, ℓ2 ∈N0 and k,k1,k2 ∈ N:∣∣T ℓ f (Xk)−E∞( f )∣∣ ≤ ‖ f‖vρ⌊ ℓr ⌋, (39)∣∣Ea(T ℓ f )−E∞( f )∣∣ ≤ ‖ f‖vρ⌊ ℓr ⌋, (40)∣∣T ℓ f (Xk)−Eb(T ℓ f )∣∣ ≤ ‖ f‖vρ⌊ ℓr ⌋, (41)∣∣T ℓ1 f (Xk1)−T ℓ2 f (Xk2)∣∣≤ ‖ f‖vρ⌊min{ℓ1,ℓ2}r ⌋. (42)
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Proof. We may assume without loss of generality that ℓ1 ≤ ℓ2. Using Equation (37), The-
orem 29(iii) and the fact that we can consider T ℓ1 as a lower transition operator in its own
right:∣∣Ea(T ℓ1 f )−Eb(T ℓ2 f )∣∣≤ d(EaT ℓ1 ,EbT ℓ2)‖ f‖v ≤ d(Ea,EbT ℓ2−ℓ1)ρ(T ℓ1)‖ f‖v.
Our proof of the first inequality (38) is complete if we realise that 0≤ d(Ea,EbT ℓ2−ℓ1)≤ 1,
and that ρ(T ℓ1)≤ ρ(T r⌊
ℓ1
r
⌋)≤ ρ(T r)⌊
ℓ1
r
⌋ by Theorem 29(i)&(ii).
Denote, for any x ∈X , by Ex the expectation operator that assigns all probability mass
to x, meaning that Ex( f ) := f (x) for all f ∈ G (X ). To prove the second inequality (39),
consider any x ∈ X and let Ea = Ex, Eb = E∞ and ℓ1 = ℓ2 = ℓ, then we infer from (38)
that indeed: ∣∣T ℓ f (x)−E
∞
( f )∣∣= ∣∣Ex(T ℓ f )−E∞(T ℓ f )∣∣≤ ‖ f‖vρ⌊ ℓr ⌋.
To prove the third inequality (40), let Eb = E∞ and ℓ1 = ℓ2 = ℓ, then we infer from (38)
that indeed: ∣∣Ea(T ℓ f )−E∞( f )∣∣= ∣∣Ea(T ℓ f )−E∞(T ℓ f )∣∣≤ ‖ f‖vρ⌊ ℓr ⌋,
where we used that E
∞
( f ) = E
∞
(T ℓ f ) for all ℓ ∈ N0; see Proposition 17.
To prove the fourth inequality (41), consider any x∈X and let Ea = Ex and ℓ1 = ℓ2 = ℓ,
then we infer from (38) that indeed:∣∣T ℓ f (x)−Eb(T ℓ f )∣∣= ∣∣Ex(T ℓ f )−Eb(T ℓ f )∣∣≤ ‖ f‖vρ⌊ ℓr ⌋.
To prove the fifth inequality (42), consider any x,y∈X and let Ea = Ex and Eb = Ey. Then
we infer from (38) that indeed:∣∣T ℓ1 f (x)−T ℓ2 f (y)∣∣= ∣∣Ex(T ℓ1 f )−Ey(T ℓ2 f )∣∣≤ ‖ f‖vρ⌊min{ℓ1,ℓ2}r ⌋. 
Lemma 31. Consider an imprecise Markov chain with initial—or marginal—model E1
and lower transition operator T . Assume that T is Perron–Frobenius-like, with invariant
lower expectation E
∞
, and let r be the smallest natural number such that ρ := ρ(T r) < 1.
Then the following statements hold for all f ∈ G (X ):
(i) |〈W 〉[T ℓ f ](X1:n)| ≤ ‖ f‖vρ⌊ ℓr ⌋ for all ℓ ∈ N0 and n ∈N.
(ii) limn→∞ 1n ∑nk=1 T n f (Xk) = E∞( f ).
(iii) limn→∞ 1n ∑nℓ=1 T ℓ f (Xn) = E∞( f ).
(iv) limn→∞ 1n ∑nk=1 Ek( f ) = E∞( f ).
Proof. Recall from Equation (33) that:
n〈W 〉[T ℓ f ](X1:n) =
[
T ℓ f (X1)−E1(T ℓ f )
]
+
n
∑
k=2
[
T ℓ f (Xk)−T ℓ+1 f (Xk−1)
]
.
If we also invoke Lemma 30, we find that:
n
∣∣〈W 〉[T ℓ f ](X1:n)∣∣≤ ∣∣T ℓ f (X1)−E1(T ℓ f )∣∣+ n∑
k=2
∣∣T ℓ f (Xk)−T ℓ+1 f (Xk−1)∣∣
≤ ‖ f‖vρ⌊ ℓr ⌋+
n
∑
k=2
‖ f‖vρ⌊ ℓr ⌋ = n‖ f‖vρ⌊ ℓr ⌋,
which proves statement (i). Similarly, by Lemma 30:∣∣∣∣1n
n
∑
k=1
[
T n f (Xk)−E∞( f )
]∣∣∣∣≤ 1n
n
∑
k=1
∣∣T n f (Xk)−E∞( f )∣∣≤ 1n
n
∑
k=1
‖ f‖vρ⌊ nr ⌋ = ‖ f‖vρ⌊ nr ⌋,
which proves statement (ii). Similarly, again by Lemma 30:∣∣∣∣1n
n
∑
ℓ=1
[
T ℓ f (Xn)−E∞( f )
]∣∣∣∣≤ 1n
n
∑
ℓ=1
∣∣T ℓ f (Xn)−E∞( f )∣∣ ≤ 1n
n
∑
ℓ=1
‖ f‖vρ⌊ ℓr ⌋
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≤
‖ f‖v
n
∞
∑
ℓ=0
ρ⌊ ℓr ⌋ = ‖ f‖v
n
r
∞
∑
s=0
ρ s = ‖ f‖v
n
r
1−ρ ,
which proves statement (iii). Finally, by Lemma 30 and an argumentation similar to our
proof for statement (iii):∣∣∣∣1n
n
∑
k=1
Ek( f )−E∞( f )
∣∣∣∣≤ 1n
n
∑
k=1
∣∣Ek( f )−E∞( f )∣∣= 1n
n
∑
k=1
∣∣E1(T k−1 f )−E∞( f )∣∣
≤
1
n
n
∑
k=1
‖ f‖vρ⌊ k−1r ⌋ ≤ ‖ f‖v
n
r
1−ρ ,
which proves statement (iv). 
We can now prove our main result.
Theorem 32 (Point-wise ergodic theorem). Consider an imprecise Markov chain with
initial—or marginal—model E1 and lower transition operator T . Assume that T is Perron–
Frobenius-like, with invariant lower expectation E
∞
. Then for all f ∈ G (X ):
liminfA [ f ]≥ 0 strictly almost surely,
and consequently,
liminf
n→∞
1
n
n
∑
k=1
f (Xk)≥ E∞( f ) strictly almost surely.
Proof. We begin with the first inequality. Let r be the smallest natural number such that
ρ := ρ(T r) < 1. Consider any q ∈ N, and let gq := ∑rq−1ℓ=0 T ℓ f , then it follows from Equa-
tion (32) and LE2 that for all n ∈ N:
W [gq](X1:n)≤
rq−1
∑
ℓ=0
W [T ℓ f ](X1:n) and therefore 〈W 〉[gq](X1:n)≤
rq−1
∑
ℓ=0
〈W 〉[T ℓ f ](X1:n).
Hence, if we also take into account Equation (36) and Lemma 31, we find that:
liminfA [ f ] = liminf
n→∞
n−1
∑
ℓ=0
〈W 〉[T ℓ f ](X1:n)
≥ liminf
n→∞
rq−1
∑
ℓ=0
〈W 〉[T ℓ f ](X1:n)+ liminf
n→∞
n−1
∑
ℓ=rq
〈W 〉[T ℓ f ](X1:n)
≥ liminf〈W 〉[gq]−‖ f‖v limsup
n→∞
n−1
∑
ℓ=rq
ρ⌊ ℓr ⌋
= liminf〈W 〉[gq]−‖ f‖v
∞
∑
ℓ=rq
ρ⌊ ℓr ⌋ ≥ liminf〈W 〉[gq]−‖ f‖vr ρ
q
1−ρ . (43)
By combining Equation (32) with the coherence [LE5 and LE8] of the local models of
the Markov chain, we see that W [gq] is a submartingale for which ∆W [gq] is uniformly
bounded. It therefore follows from our strong law of large numbers for submartingale dif-
ferences [Corollary 8] that liminf〈W 〉[gq]≥ 0 strictly almost surely, meaning that there is
some test supermartingale T (q) that converges to +∞ on any path ω for which liminf〈W 〉[gq]<
0. Furthermore, by the argumentation in the proof of Corollary 8, we also know that 0 ≤
T (q)(x1:n) ≤ (
3
2 )
n for all n ∈ N and x1:n ∈ X1:n. If we now invoke Equation (43), we see
that T (q) converges to +∞ on any path ω where liminfn→∞ A [ f ](ω)<−‖ f‖v rρ
q
1−ρ .
Now consider any sequence of positive real numbers w(q) such that ∑q∈N w(q) = 1, then
it follows from the considerations above that the sequence of non-negative real numbers
ai(x1:n) := ∑iq=1 w(q)T (q)(x1:n), i ∈ N is non-decreasing and bounded above by ( 32 )n, and
therefore converges to a non-negative real number, for all n ∈ N and x1:n ∈ X1:n. Hence,
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we can define the real process T := ∑q∈Nw(q)T (q), which clearly converges to +∞ on any
path ω where liminfn→∞ A [ f ](ω) < 0. Moreover, T () = 1 and T is non-negative. So
we are done with the first inequality if we can prove that T is a supermartingale. Consider,
therefore, any situation s and any Q(·|s) ∈M(Q(·|s)), then, if we denote its (probability)
mass function by p(·|s):
Q(∆T |s) = ∑
x∈X
p(x|s)∆T (s)(x) = ∑
x∈X
p(x|s) ∑
q∈N
w(q)∆T (q)(s)(x)
= ∑
q∈N
w(q) ∑
x∈X
p(x|s)∆T (q)(s)(x) = ∑
q∈N
w(q)Q(∆T (q)(s)|s) ≤ 0,
where the inequality follows from Q(∆T (q)(s)|s) ≤ Q(∆T (q)(s)|s) ≤ 0; see Equation (1).
If we now recall Equation (2), we see that indeed Q(∆T (s)|s) ≤ 0.
The second inequality is equivalent with the first by Lemma 31(iv). 
We can fairly easily extend this result to gambles that depend on a finite number of
states.
Corollary 33. Consider an imprecise Markov chain with initial—or marginal—model E1
and lower transition operator T . Assume that T is Perron–Frobenius-like, with invariant
lower expectation E
∞
. Then for all f ∈ G (X r), with r ∈ N:
liminf
n→∞
1
n
n
∑
k=1
f (Xk:k+r−1)≥ Est( f (X1:r)) strictly almost surely. (44)
Proof. We give a proof by induction. We know from Theorem 32 that Equation (44) holds
for r = 1. Now consider any q ∈ N, and assume as our induction hypothesis that Equa-
tion (44) holds for r = q, then we prove that it also holds for r = q+ 1.
Consider any f ∈ G (X q+1), and define the real process M by letting M (X1:ℓ) := 0 for
ℓ= 0,1, . . . ,q and
M (X1:q+n) :=
n−1
∑
k=0
[ f (Xk+1:k+q+1)−E( f (Xk+1:k+q+1)|X1:k+q)] for all n ∈N.
Then for any n ∈N0 and any situation x1:q+n ∈X1:q+n, we find that
∆M (x1:q+n)(Xq+n+1) = M (x1:q+nXq+n+1)−M (x1:q+n)
= f (xn+1:n+qXq+n+1)−E( f (Xn+1:q+n+1)|x1:n+q)
= f (xn+1:n+qXq+n+1)−Q( f (xn+1:n+qXq+n+1)|x1:n+q),
where the last equality follows from Corollary 3, and therefore, coherence [LE8] implies
that Q(∆M (x1:q+n)|x1:q+n) = 0. Similary, for any ℓ ∈ {0,1, . . . ,q−1} and any x1:ℓ ∈X1:ℓ,
coherence [LE5] implies that Q(∆M (x1:ℓ)|x1:ℓ) = Q(0|x1:ℓ) = 0. Hence, we conclude that
M is a submartingale, whose differences are uniformly bounded [because f is, trivially
so]. Corollary 8 then tells us that liminf〈M 〉 ≥ 0 strictly almost surely, or in other words
that there is a test supermartingale T that converges to +∞ on the event A := {ω ∈
Ω : liminf〈M 〉(ω)< 0}.
Now observe that—keeping in mind that the second terms always lie between min f and
max f , due to LE5:
liminf
n→∞
1
n
n
∑
k=1
f (Xk:k+q) = liminf
n→∞
[
〈M 〉(X1:n+q)+
1
n
n−1
∑
k=0
E( f (Xk+1:k+q+1)|X1:k+q)
]
≥ liminf
n→∞
〈M 〉(X1:n+q)+ liminf
n→∞
1
n
n−1
∑
k=0
E( f (Xk+1:k+q+1)|X1:k+q).
(45)
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If we consider the gamble g(X1:q) := Est( f (X1:q+1)|X1:q) that only depends on the first q
states, then it follows from Corollary 3 and the Markov condition (17) that for all x1:q ∈
X1:q
g(x1:q) = Est( f (X1:q+1)|x1:q) = Q( f (x1:qXq+1)|x1:q) = Q( f (x1:qXq+1)|xq). (46)
Similarly, it follows from Corollary 3, the Markov condition (17) and Equation (46) that
for all k ∈ N0 and all x1:k+q ∈X1:k+q
E( f (Xk+1:k+q+1)|x1:k+q) = Q( f (xk+1:k+qXk+q+1)|x1:k+q)
= Q( f (xk+1:k+qXk+q+1)|xk+q) = g(xk+1:k+q),
and therefore the inequality (45) can be rewritten as
liminf
n→∞
1
n
n
∑
k=1
f (Xk:k+q)≥ liminf
n→∞
〈M 〉(X1:n+q)+ liminf
n→∞
1
n
n
∑
k=1
g(Xk:k+q−1). (47)
We infer from the induction hypothesis that for the second term on the right-hand side
liminf
n→∞
1
n
n
∑
k=1
g(Xk:k+q−1)≥ Est(g(X1:q)) strictly almost surely,
meaning that there is some test supermartingale T ∗ that converges to +∞ on the set B of
all paths where this inequality does not hold. This in turn implies that
liminf
n→∞
1
n
n
∑
k=1
f (Xk:k+q)≥ Est(g(X1:q)) strictly almost surely,
because it follows from (47) that the paths where this inequality does not hold must belong
to A∪B, where the test supermartingale 12(T +T
∗) converges to +∞. Now observe that
Est(g(X1:q)) = Est(Est( f (X1:q+1)|X1:q)) = Est( f (X1:q+1)),
by Theorem 16 [with m := 0 and n := q]. 
10. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
We have motivated expressions for joint lower and upper expectations on extended real-
valued variables for imprecise Markov chains (with finite state spaces), and proved various
interesting properties for them. This has allowed us to deal quite elegantly with transition
and return times, but we expect our approach to be equally useful in other problems involv-
ing unbounded and/or extended real-valued variables.
We have also proved versions of the point-wise ergodic theorem for our imprecise
Markov chains, involving (bounded) functions of a finite number of states. It is a subject of
current research whether this result can be extended to gambles that depend on the entire
state trajectory, and not just on a finite number of states.
Our version in Theorem 32 subsumes the one for (precise) Markov chains discussed in
the Introduction, because there E
∞
( f ) = E∞( f ) = E∞( f ) and therefore
E∞( f ) = E∞( f )≥ limsup
n→∞
1
n
n
∑
k=1
f (Xk)≥ liminf
n→∞
1
n
n
∑
k=1
f (Xk)≥ E∞( f ) = E∞( f )
strictly almost surely,
implying that 1
n ∑nk=1 f (Xk) converges to E∞( f ) (strictly) almost surely. In our more general
case, however, we cannot generally prove that there is almost sure convergence, and we
retain only almost sure inequalities involving limits inferior and superior, as is also the
case for our strong law of large numbers for submartingale differences. Indeed, that such
convergence should not really be expected for imprecise probability models was already
argued by Walley and Fine [22].
Ergodicity results for Markov chains are quite relevant for applications in queuing the-
ory, where they are for instance used to prove Little’s law [23], or ASTA (Arrivals See
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Time Averages) properties [14]. We believe the discussion in this paper could be instru-
mental in deriving similar properties for queues where the probability models for arrivals
and departures are imprecise.
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